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My dissertation includes three essays which focus on employee departure from 
organizations.  In the first two essays, I study how employee departure allows individuals 
to capture more value from their firms.  The third essay examines the effect of employee 
departure on firm performance.  Each essay identifies an important theoretical puzzle 
related to employee departures and sheds light on its resolution through careful research 
design.  In total, this dissertation aims to challenge the way that researchers typically 
think about employee departures, both theoretically and empirically.    
The theoretical puzzle in the first essay relates to the connection between the 
failure of one firm and the birth of other firms.  Does the failure of a rival firm cause the 
employees of existing firms to create entrepreneurial startups?  On the one hand, theory 
suggests that the answer is yes – rival failures may release resources that potential 
entrepreneurs can use to start new firms.  On the other hand, theory suggests that the 
answer is no – rival failures indicate to potential entrepreneurs that the environment is not 
munificent enough to support new entry.  Using US Census data on the legal services 
industry, I disentangle these two arguments by examining law firm failures that are 
preceded by the unexpected deaths of highly paid attorneys.  I find strong evidence that 
these quasi-random failures (which are likely to be weakly related to the broader 
economic environment) cause attorneys in rival firms to create startups, while other types 
 
 
of rival failures depress entry rates, probably because they proxy for weakness in the 
local industry.  This essay thus provides a theoretical rationale for when the failure of one 
firm will lead to the creation of another while demonstrating an often-discussed but rarely 
demonstrated positive side effect of firm failure – a failed firm provides the component 
parts for new organizations. 
The puzzle in my second essay relates to the effect that one employee’s departure 
has on the bargaining power and monetary earnings of his or her colleagues.  This issue is 
likely particularly salient for members of underrepresented groups within an 
organization, such as women in the legal services industry, which hosts this study.  
Theory might dictate that the departure of a highly paid woman would hurt her female 
colleagues’ earnings by reducing their bargaining power through the elimination of a 
mentor and advocate.  However, an alternative mechanism suggests that the departure of 
a highly paid woman might provide her colleagues with increased bargaining power due 
to a relative scarcity of women in the organization.   
Using unexpected death as a stand-in for departure, I find that women experience 
an 8% average increase in earnings after a female colleague passes away suddenly.  This 
increase is significantly larger than what women experience when the deceased colleague 
is male, and it outpaces gains that male attorneys experience when a colleague of either 
gender passes away.  Additional analyses suggest that the departure of a woman from a 
law firm may imbue her female colleagues with increased bargaining power related to 
client acquisition or the firm’s interest in maintaining gender diversity.  This essay points 
out a paradox related to the bargaining power of underrepresented groups.  While much 
of the organizations’ literature suggests that a group’s overall bargaining power will 
 
 
increase as a function of the group’s size, I find that an individual’s bargaining power 
increases as the size of her overall group shrinks.   
The third essay extends the literature connecting employee turnover and 
organizational performance by inserting the firm’s manager into the causal system 
linking these two processes.  The theoretical puzzle I address in this essay is whether 
managerial tenure weakens or exacerbates employee-level turnover’s negative effect on 
organizational performance.  Managers with longer tenure may have superior knowledge 
of their firm’s routines and remaining stock of human resources, allowing them to 
respond effectively to key employee departure.  However, theories related to 
organizational inertia suggest an opposite effect:  managerial stability may reduce an 
organization’s ability to respond to change.   I analyze data from the National Football 
League to test this argument.  Using injuries to quarterbacks as a quasi-random source of 
employee departure and casting the head coach as the team’s top manager, I find support 
for the second argument.  Analyses indicate that NFL teams whose coaches have longer 
tenure perform worse following quarterback injury.  The contribution of this essay is to 
show that stability at one level of the organization can exacerbate turmoil at another 





















Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 











Professor Rajshree Agarwal, Chair 
Professor Cristian Dezsö 
Professor Waverly Ding 
Professor David Sicilia 






















Rajshree Agarwal has held my hand, kicked my butt, spiked a volleyball in my 
face, convinced me to move back to Champaign-Urbana as a twenty-three year old man, 
and otherwise given me every single advantage a grad student could hope for from an 
adviser. Many would say I have had it too easy. When I was evaluating PhD programs, I 
tried to get an idea of what it would be like to work with potential advisers by reading the 
acknowledgements to their student’s dissertations.  If anyone in a similar situation is 
reading this in 2013 or 2050 – heed these words:  work with Rajshree.  She will match 
you effort-for-effort, she will care about you the person as much as you the student, and 
there will be no limitations on what you can achieve. 
If Rajshree is my Yoda, then Ben Campbell is my Obi Wan Kenobi.  Ben started 
working with me when I was so raw that I used “data” as a singular noun (Mahoney, 
2008), and he taught me the nuts and bolts of research and how our career works.  If you 
read a collection of Ben’s emails to me over the years, you will see the source material 
for this dissertation and a survival guide to grad school.  I could not ask for a better 
mentor, coauthor, and friend.   
I owe an incredible amount of thanks to my dissertation committee.  No one asks 
better questions than Cristian Dezsö, and he generously applied that talent to this project, 
reading each of my drafts, attending all of my talks, and giving me outstanding, 
unvarnished advice at every turn.  Waverly Ding gave me a similarly generous 
investment and her influence is the primary reason that my work is starting to head down 
a more sociology-oriented road.  David Sicilia is an extremely thoughtful scholar, and the 
best signal that I have of the quality of this document is that David passed me despite the 
fact that I did not fulfill his pre-defense request for chocolate donuts.   It is not hyperbole 
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to say that Dave Waguespack’s class on research design completely changed my 
approach to research, and it happened at the crucial time when I was casting around for 
dissertation ideas. I will not write another paper without first asking myself, “What is the 
ideal experiment?” 
Each of the other faculty at UMD provided insight or support at some point 
during my time here.  In particular, Wilbur Chung, Bennet Zelner, and Maggie Zhou gave 
me excellent job market advice, and Gilad Chen, Brent Goldfarb, David Kirsch, and 
Subra Tangirala gave me crucial tips on my job market presentation.   
The faculty at Illinois left an imprint on me that will not rub off anytime soon.  
Joe Mahoney is a scholar in the truest sense, and his memory intimidates me in the same 
way that Rajshree’s energy does – watching him quote papers verbatim from memory 
while including page numbers is a formative moment for any student who passes through 
Illinois. Glenn Hoetker had the same impact on my knowledge of empirical methods that 
Dave Waguespack had on my perspective on research design.  Deepak Somaya has been 
a terrific coauthor and mentor who, like Ben Campbell, gives me a model for writing 
papers about people while still being a strategy researcher.  Brooke Elliott, Andrew 
Isserman, Steve Michael, and Mark Peecher each encouraged me to try academia, and I 
would not be here without their nudges. 
My lasting memory of U of Maryland will be discussions of identification and 
other problems with some combination of Dave Anderson, Justina Blanco, Beth 
Campbell-Bush, Justin “Frosted” Frake, Shweta Gaonkar, Brad “Are We Not Doing 
This?” Greenwood, Shannon Lantzy, Daniel Malter, Mahka Moeen, Dan Olson, 
MaryJane Rabier, Bryan Stroube, Robert Vesco, and Annie Zavyalova.  Many of these 
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conversations made my dissertation much, much better than it would have been 
otherwise, and they certainly kept me happy and sane over the last three years.  
Greenwood deserves special thanks for organizing it all and teaching me a number of 
lessons.  MaryJane deserves special thanks for showing me why business cards are 
important.  Mahka deserves special thanks for never letting anything slide.  
Because I did my coursework there, my lasting memory of grad school at Illinois 
will be incomprehensible matrices, but Erik Bushey, Greg Fisher, Martin Ganco, Chih 
Lui, John Mawdsley, and especially Marleen “Not Baumol” McCormick made my 
second go-round in Champoo-Banana completely worth it.  Atsushi Ohyama gave me 
crucial empirical tips on the first essay and is an econometrics wizard. 
While I have climbed up the shoulders of every student who preceded me at 
UIUC and UMD, Martin Ganco and Daniel Malter deserve special thanks for providing 
me with a template for success and clearing a path that made my job search much easier.    
I owe a special debt - at least one year of school - to Frank Limehouse and Arnie 
Reznek at the Census Bureau for bending over backwards to give me more time with the 
data used the first two essays.  The Kauffman Foundation and the Strategy Research 
Foundation also provided critical funding for this project. 
Turning to my debts outside of school, Nate VanRaden single-handedly kept me 
going in my first year, and being able to sleep on the couch owned by Nate, Adam 
Bialon, and Pat Boland in my second year gave me the motivation I needed to make trips 
to Chicago to use Census Data.  The roadtrips I took with Nate and Nick Poggioli gave 
me something to work towards and will undoubtedly stand among the best memories of 
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my life.  An open question in the literature is whether I will get tenure before Radha 
Gajjar finishes watching The Wire.  
My family deserves the biggest thanks of all.  My sister Meredy is my best friend, 
so much so that I married her this month.  To Paul Dahlgren (Greenwood, 2013). The fact 
that someone so talented and wonderful thinks that I am talented and wonderful gives me 
the confidence to crush anything in my path.  My parents, Patty and KC, created a home 
where two things are inexhaustible – unconditional love and the motivation to get things 
done.  On top of that, they have struck a perfect balance:  Meredy and I know that we are 
the most important thing in the world to them, but they let us live our lives and have 
never treated us like conduits for their own existence.  I am probably the only PhD 
student who can say that his favorite job talk took place in his family’s living room and 
lasted for three hours. What a reader can learn from the essays that follow these 
acknowledgements is debatable, but at the very least you now know how much my 
family means to me and how proud I am to be their son and brother. 
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My dissertation includes three essays which focus on employee departure from 
organizations.  Employee departure is a significant phenomenon - voluntary turnover rates 
averaged between 9.8% and 12.5% between 2008 and 2012 in the United States, with higher 
skilled industries like banking and finance and legal services at the upper end of the distribution 
(CompData, 2012).  Consequently, departures attract the attention of a wide range of researchers, 
including those in management, economics, sociology, and psychology.  My dissertation draws 
on work in each of these areas, combining insights from each to identify and disentangle novel 
causal processes and mechanisms related to the departure of employees from organizations.  
 Because employee departure is a broad-based phenomenon, I focus my contribution by 
examining two of its implications across the three essays of this dissertation.  In the first two 
essays, I study how employee departure allows individuals to appropriate more value.  Departure 
has long been cast as an important value appropriation mechanism, as the threat of mobility 
allows individuals to capture more value from their current firm (Coff, 1999), and individual 
earnings often increase following a change in organizations (Tope1, 1992).  I depart from this 
existing work in the first essay by examining departures where employees start new firms, 
framing entrepreneurship as a value appropriation mechanism which allows individuals to 
exploit valuable resources without having to share the spoils with an organization.  In the second 
essay, I provide a new perspective on the connection between departure and value appropriation 
by examining how the earnings of colleagues change when a highly paid person exits the firm.  I 
argue that the departure of a highly paid individual releases contestable organizational resources 
while shifting the bargaining coalitions of the firm, creating unique opportunities for individuals 
to capture value.     
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 The third essay examines the effect of employee departure on firm performance.  While a 
growing literature examines the connection between these two constructs, it focuses entirely on 
the employee group at risk of departure while abstracting away from the multi-level nature of 
most organizations, where employees are often supervised by managers.  This essay takes a 
multi-level approach to the connection between employee departure and firm performance by 
examining whether stability at the managerial level reduces or exacerbates the negative effect on 
firm performance that stems from the departure of a key employee.   
 A major challenge in the empirical study of employee departures is the identification of 
causal effects.  An employee’s decision to exit an organization is complex and likely to be 
interrelated with the processes determining individual earnings, firm performance, or any host of 
other constructs that a researcher may try to correlate with employee departure.  Consequently, 
scholars must grapple with a host of identification problems related to omitted variable bias, 
simultaneity, and reverse causality.  Measurement error can also be an issue, as many studies of 
employee turnover rely on single-informant surveys which aggregate firm-level turnover rates 
over extended periods of time.  Complicating matters is the fact that laboratory experiments are 
difficult to conceive for this phenomenon, because artificially designed “organizations” from 
which employees may depart are unlikely to have strong external validity.   
 My dissertation attends to these methodological issues while providing a rich set of 
theoretical contributions that challenge the way that researchers think about employee departure 
from organizations.  Each essay identifies a theoretical puzzle or tension in the existing literature 
and sheds light on its resolution through careful research design.  As a consequence, this 
dissertation tries to meet the often competing demands of theoretical richness and empirical 
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clarity.  I next describe the theoretical puzzle and research design present in each of the three 
essays. 
The theoretical puzzle in the first essay relates to the connection between the failure of 
one firm and the birth of other firms.  Prior work has examined this question from the industry 
level of analysis. An important issue with examining the connection between failure and entry at 
the industry level is that the analyst cannot determine who is starting new firms – “new” firms 
might simply smaller pieces of failed firms helmed by the failed firm’s employees.  I solve this 
issue by focusing on the employees of firms that do not fail and casting the research question as 
one of employee departure – does the failure of a rival firm cause employees in healthy firms to 
quit their jobs in order to start new organizations? 
The puzzle inherent in this question comes from the two competing effects that a rival 
firm’s failure will likely have on a potential entrepreneur in an existing organization.  On the one 
hand, the rival failure releases resources like customers, land, employees, intellectual property, 
and so on, into the marketplace, where they can likely be obtained for a lower price than when 
the rival firm continued to operate (Hiatt, Sine & Tolbert, 2009).  The availability of these 
resources may increase the attractiveness of new firm creation for employees of existing 
organizations.  On the other hand, the failure of a rival firm may also send a negative signal to 
potential entrepreneurs elsewhere in the industry (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990).  A rival firm’s 
failure may indicate that the current industry environment is not munificent enough for a new 
firm, thus reducing the probability that employees of existing firms will depart their jobs to start 
new organizations. 
I resolve this theoretical tension empirically by identifying a class of firm failures that 
should be less related to the broader economic environment than others – failures preceded by 
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the unexpected death of one of the firm’s highly paid members.  These types of failures arguably 
provide a weaker signal about environmental munificence to potential entrepreneurs in other 
firms, since the unexpected death of the highly paid person should be the primary causal factor 
behind the firm’s dissolution, and it is arguably exogenous to the broader economic environment.  
Analyzing confidential employer-employee linked microdata on the legal services industry from 
the US Census Bureau, I find that rival firm failures that are preceded by the death of a highly 
paid attorney increase new firm creation by employees working for existing firms.  Here, the 
clients and attorneys that are released by the rival firm’s unexpected dissolution likely create 
opportunities for employees of other firms to depart their jobs and start new organizations.  
Conversely, when a rival’s failure is not preceded by an attorney’s unexpected death, I find that 
employees of existing firms are less likely to start new organizations.  In these cases, the failure 
of the rival firm may proxy for weakness in the economic environment, sending a signal to 
potential entrepreneurs working for other organizations that conditions are not appropriate for 
new firm creation. 
In addition to resolving a long standing theoretical and empirical tension in the literature 
related to the causal relationship between firm exit and firm creation, this essay connects the 
large literature concerned with the effect of the external environment on employee departure 
with the literature examining employee entrepreneurship.  March and Simon (1958: 53) first 
discuss of the importance of the “availability of external alternatives” in determining whether 
workers will quit their jobs.  Prior papers in this tradition would likely predict that rival failures 
would reduce the probability of employee departure, since fewer external alternatives in the form 
of jobs with existing firms would likely be available following a rival’s failure (Haveman & 
Cohen, 1994).  This paper highlights the difference between entrepreneurial departures and other 
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departures by showing how the destruction of jobs with existing firms can lead to the creation of 
jobs with new firms via the release of resources from failed firms and their recombination with 
resources (particularly employees) of existing organizations. 
This insight has particularly important implications for firm strategy.  Whereas a strict 
market power (Porter, 1980) view of strategy would likely view the dissolution of a competitor 
as a positive outcome, here we see that a competitor’s failure has an important side effect – it 
releases resources that may incentivize an existing firm’s employees to exit the organization to 
start a new competitor.  Prior work suggests that these new ventures may be particularly harmful 
to their parent firms (Phillips, 2002), especially in a professional services context like legal 
services (Campbell et al., 2012), where competition for clients is likely to be relatively easy for 
startups as compared to new firms in other industries, particularly those industries with large 
economies of scale. 
The puzzle in my second essay relates to the effect that one employee’s departure has on 
the monetary earnings of his or her colleagues.  This issue may be particularly salient for 
members of underrepresented groups within an organization.  If a highly paid member of an 
underrepresented group, such as a female executive, departs the organization, the consequences 
for the women she leaves behind are unclear.  On the one hand, organizational mentors are 
crucial inputs for career success (Briscoe & Kellogg, 2011), and to the extent that homophily 
drives the sorting of mentoring relationships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001), the 
departure of an important ally could weaken the remaining individual’s position in the firm.  On 
the other hand, the departure of a similar colleague may cause the bargaining power of remaining 
individuals to increase due to a sudden scarcity of skills that may be unique to that group (Burt, 
1997), allowing them to capture more value. 
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I examine this puzzle through the lens of gender earnings inequality in American legal 
services firms.  I use a novel empirical design to distinguish between these two theoretical 
predictions.   Using the same confidential and comprehensive employer-employee matched legal 
services microdata as in the first essay, I analyze how attorneys’ earnings change after a highly 
paid colleague dies unexpectedly. While the process that determines traditional turnover is likely 
highly interrelated with the process that determines colleague earnings, unexpected deaths are 
arguably randomly assigned (e.g. Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang, 2010). Matching firms that 
experience a death to observably equivalent firms that do not, our quasi-experimental set up 
allows us to make relatively credible causal inferences about the impact of highly paid attorney 
exit on the earnings of colleagues who remain with the organization. 
The results are striking.  Following a highly paid colleague’s death, the average earnings 
of other members of the firm increase about 3% relative to the control group.  This increase may 
occur because surviving members of the firm inherit the client work that was formerly completed 
by the deceased attorney.  The deeper insight comes when we examine how the gender of the 
deceased and the gender of the surviving attorney moderate this result.  Men experience a 
relatively small increase in earnings when a colleague passes away, and this increase is not 
dependent on whether the deceased person is male or female.  Women, on the other hand, 
experience a large (8%) increase in earnings after a female colleague passes away; this increase 
is significantly larger than what women experience when the deceased colleague is male.   This 
suggests that women are somehow uniquely positioned to benefit when one of their female 
colleagues exits the firm. 
Examining moderators of this key relationship in order to pin down the mechanisms at 
play, we find that the result is stronger when the surviving female attorney is higher in the firm’s 
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earnings distribution at the time of her colleague’s death, older then her deceased female 
colleague, or higher in the firm’s earning distribution than her deceased female colleague.  These 
results suggest that highly paid women benefit the most from the death of their highly paid 
female colleagues.  Although I cannot observe client relationships in the data, it is plausible that 
this outcome may be a result of gender homophily (Beckman & Phillips, 2005; McPherson et al., 
2001), where clients of the deceased woman are more likely to migrate to her female coworkers.  
It may also suggest that an increase in bargaining power following a highly paid woman’s death 
flows most directly to other highly paid women whose visibility makes them important for the 
firm’s maintenance of legitimacy in a marketplace that may have preferences for gender 
diversity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).   
The primary contribution of this essay is to point out a paradox related to the bargaining 
power of underrepresented groups in organizations.  While much of the organizations’ literature 
suggests that a group’s overall bargaining power will increase as a function of the group’s size 
(Coff, 1999; Blau & Murningham, 1998), I find that an individual’s bargaining power increases 
as her overall group shrinks in size.  This is consistent with Burt’s (1997) notion that employees 
have increased bargaining power when their skills are scarce, and expands his idea to include 
demographic characteristics which may have external legitimacy as well as functional 
considerations. 
This paper is also among the first to view an employee’s exit from the firm through the 
lens of his or her remaining colleagues.  Other literature in this vein mostly examines how one 
employee’s departure might spur the departure of others (Ballinger et al., 2010; Felps et al., 
2009), but this essay highlights the release of resources that accompanies a highly paid person’s 
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exit from the firm and illuminates how demographic characteristics may leave some remaining 
employees better positioned to capture these resources than others.  
The third essay connects employee departures to organizational performance.  To this 
point, most work has focused on studying and quantifying the disruptive effects of turnover.  In 
this paper, I extend this line of inquiry by envisioning the effect of departures on organizational 
performance as a multi-level process.  In particular, I examine how stability at the managerial 
level of the organization moderates the negative effect of turnover at the employee level.  The 
exit of a key employee puts the onus on the organization’s manager to craft a response that 
minimizes disruption and allows the organization to continue effective operations (March & 
Simon, 1958).  Surprisingly, prior work abstracts away from the interaction between 
management and turnover.    
The theoretical puzzle I address in this essay is whether managerial tenure weakens or 
exacerbates the negative effect on organizational performance of turnover at the employee level. 
Some theories of organizational routines in the tradition of Nelson & Winter (1982) suggest that 
longer tenured managers should be well-positioned to shield their organizations from the 
negative effects of the departure of important lower-level employees.  Managers with longer 
tenure may have superior knowledge of their firm’s routines and remaining stock of human 
resources, allowing them to respond effectively to key employee departure.  However, theories 
related to organizational inertia (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992) suggest 
an opposite effect of routinization: stability can reduce an organization’s ability to respond to 
change.  When a manager has longer tenure, the organization’s experience with change is rather 
limited, so its routines for dealing with change may ossify.  As a result, when a key employee 
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departs, the organization may be unable to respond effectively to the shock, and performance 
may decline even more precipitously than if the manager had shorter tenure. 
I implement a robust empirical design to test this argument.  The endogenous connection 
between employee departure and organizational performance makes causal inference a unique 
challenge for empirical researchers.  I overcome this issue by studying the performance of 
National Football League teams during the 2011 and 2012 regular seasons, using injuries to the 
team’s most important player, the quarterback, as a quasi-random (Stuart, 2012) source of 
employee exit.  I cast the head coach of each NFL team as the organization’s top manager.  In 
addition to the quasi-random nature of injuries, the depth of historical performance and career 
data available in this context allows me to include variables that are typically omitted in 
organizational performance regressions in other settings. 
My results support the second argument – teams with longer tenured coaches perform 
worse following injury to the team’s quarterback.  This result is not driven by the overlap in 
tenure between the coach and quarterback, and is robust to controls for observable managerial 
quality.  It appears that well-established routines may buckle after the shock of an employee’s 
departure. 
The primary contribution of this essay lies in its consideration of employee departure as a 
multi-level organizational phenomenon. It is the first to consider how stability at one level of the 
organization can compensate for or exacerbate turmoil at a different level of the organization.  
This insight is important because it connects the literature on organizational routines to the 
literature on employee turnover while focusing on organizational performance, thus drawing 




To strategy scholars, this essay provides micro-level insights to upper echelon theory.  
Stability at the top of the firm can become a performance liability when the organization 
experiences sudden change further down in the organization’s hierarchy.  For organization 
theorists, the essay suggests that well-established routines can crumble quickly when one of their 
main exponents exits the organization.  Finally, for human resource management scholars, I 
provide the insight that the causal chain connecting employee turnover to organizational 
performance runs through the managers that remain with the firm after employees depart.  Each 
of these ideas has to potential to stimulate follow-on work. 
Through three essays, this dissertation connects employee departures to individual value 
capture and organizational performance.   In each essay, I identify an important theoretical 
puzzle related to one of these topics.  I shed light on each of these puzzles by building multi-
disciplinary theory and testing its arguments with careful research design.  The results have 
important implications for individual careers, firm strategy and performance, and economic 




NEW FIRM CREATION FOLLOWING 
FAILURE OF RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Although a long line of organizational scholars (e.g. Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990) have examined creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) of incumbent 
organizations by entrepreneurial entrants, the reverse of this process – the causal effect of 
incumbent failure on entrepreneurship remains largely unexamined.  Are the employees of 
existing firms more likely to create startups following the demise of rival organizations?  This 
question has important implications for individual careers, firm strategy, and structure of 
markets.  An affirmative answer implies that firm failure may create positive spillovers by 
spurring other individuals in the industry to start new firms, reallocating resources and 
potentially stimulating long-run economic growth.  In addition, while failure of rivals is 
generally considered a positive strategic outcome, existing firms may experience negative side 
effects if the failure spurs their own employees to create competing startups as a result.  
The causal effect of rival failure on new venture creation by employees of existing firms 
is not clear ex ante.  For the focal employee contemplating exit from her current job to create a 
startup, the failure of a rival firm would likely have two competing effects.  Rival firm failure 
may be a signal that the current economic environment is not conducive to successful firm 
creation and survival (Aldrich, 1990).  Alternatively, rival firm failure releases numerous 
resources, including intellectual property (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007), customers (Hiatt, Sine & 
Tolbert, 2009), physical assets (Fortune & Mitchell, 2011), and employees (Haveman & Cohen, 
1994; Rider, 2012a). 
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Scholars considering the relationship between incumbent failure and entrepreneurial 
entry have not resolved this puzzle.  Organizational ecology and evolutionary economics 
scholars use the population or industry level of analysis and find negative correlations (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990; Land, Davis & Blau, 1994; Halliday, Powell & Granfors, 1987), positive 
correlations (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson, 1989; Hiatt et al., 2009; 
Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008), and insignificant correlations (Agarwal & Gort, 1996) between the 
failure rate of incumbents and the entry rate in a variety of industries.  However, researchers 
examining organizational genealogy (e.g. Phillips, 2002) and employee entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Agarwal et al., 2004) emphasize that the decision to start a new firm is a multi-level 
phenomenon, heavily dependent on the attributes of the individual (e.g. Elfenbein, Hamilton & 
Zenger, 2010) as well as those of the employer (e.g. Sørenson, 2007) in which she is currently 
embedded.1  
Integrating population level insights from organizational ecology and evolutionary 
economics with micro-level mechanisms highlighted by organizational genealogists, I theorize 
that rival firm failure represents an important resource release that employees of existing firms 
contemplating new venture creation may capitalize upon. I further suggest that this resource 
release may be a more important mechanism for entrepreneurial entry for employees with higher 
earnings and employees who may be under-rewarded at their current organizations. 
Empirically, I solve the puzzle highlighted above by leveraging a design that allows me 
to disentangle the release of resources that accompany rival failure from the negative signal that 
failure sends about the business environment.  Examining confidential employer-employee 
                                                 
1 As Carroll and Khessina (2005: 2) point out in their review of ecological explanations for entrepreneurship, “the types 
of theoretical explanations offered for population-level processes may not be directly applicable to individuals.” See also 
Aldrich (1990) for a similar critique.  Haveman and Cohen’s (1994) study of ecological events and individual mobility in 
the savings and loan industry also calls for a deeper examination of how population-level processes affect individuals. 
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linked US Census microdata on the legal services industry obtained from the Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics program (LEHD), I use the unexpected deaths of partner 
attorneys as an instrument for the failure of the firms that employ them.  Without 
instrumentation, I find a negative correlation between the failure of rivals and the probability that 
an employee of an existing firm will leave her job for entrepreneurship.  However this 
correlation is likely plagued by a number of unobserved variables, such as a decline in the 
business environment.  Using the instrument to set aside these unobservables and examine the 
causal effect, I find the exact opposite result:  rival failure has a strong positive effect on 
entrepreneurship by existing firm employees, suggesting that the release of resources following 
firm failure may enable the creation of startups by other individuals in the industry.  I predict and 
find that this relationship is stronger for higher wage attorneys who are better positioned to 
capture resources and weaker for attorneys working for firms with stronger pecuniary incentives.  
The rewards provided by these firms may obviate the need capture value from released resources 
via entrepreneurship (Sørenson & Sharkey, 2010).  Further unpacking the mechanism behind this 
result through supplementary analyses and qualitative interviews, it appears that the availability 
of startup cofounders is primarily responsible for the increase in startup propensity following 
rival dissolutions. 
THEORY 
Conflicting Results on the Relationship between Failure and Entry 
Prior scholars examining the connection between incumbent failure and entrepreneurial 
entry operate primarily at the population level of analysis and find conflicting results.  Using 
either the lens of organizational ecology or evolutionary economics, some scholars predict and 
find positive correlations between incumbent failure and entry, and others predict and find 
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negative correlations between incumbent failure and entry.  Ecology researchers arguing that the 
relationship should be positive focus on the release of relatively immobile resources such as 
physical capital, customers, and employees (e.g. Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Hiatt et al., 2009; 
Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008) that potential entrepreneurs can seize upon to create new firms.  
Evolutionary economists who find a positive relationship emphasize the recursive relationship 
between failure and entry:  since entry increases competition in the industry, it may hasten the 
exit of incumbent firms (Dunne et al., 1988), resulting in a positive correlation between exit and 
entry rates.  Scholars finding a negative relationship focus on the negative signal that failures 
send to potential entrepreneurs about the quality of the business environment (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990; Land et al., 1994; Holliday et al., 1987). 
Operating at the population level of analysis makes it difficult for researchers to 
disentangle the mechanisms underlying the opposing theoretical claims.  Two problems arise in 
testing theory that predicts a positive relationship between the failure rate and the entry rate.  
First, as evolutionary economists point out, rather than incumbent failure stimulating entry, entry 
may be causing incumbent failure by increasing competition in the industry.  Second, authors 
cannot distinguish who is starting the firms that are formed in the wake of failure.  The theory of 
resource release seems to apply to agents who are not former employees of the failed 
organizations, but it is quite possible that recently unemployed individuals may be starting many 
of new firms observed in the wake of failure because they have few other employment options 
(Hachner & Granrose, 1985).  Consequently, incumbent failure may not cause entrepreneurial 
entry per se, but rather it may result in a proliferation of new firms that are merely modular 
pieces of recently failed organizations.  Finally, arguments for a negative relationship between 
incumbent failure and entrepreneurial entry rely not as much on failures themselves causing 
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lower entry, but on failures proxying for general weakness in the economic environment which 
suppresses entry by potential entrepreneurs (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990). 
Entrepreneurship by Employees of Existing Organizations 
The resolution of these issues may be possible by shifting focus from the population to 
the individual level of analysis and examining the causal effect of rival failure on entrepreneurial 
entry by employees of existing firms.  Employees of existing firms may be interested in founding 
new startups to capture higher pecuniary returns (Campbell, 2012) or to gain the nonpecuniary 
benefits that come with increased autonomy (Benz & Frey, 2008).  However, they likely face 
significant resource constraints that may prevent them from creating new firms (Wasserman, 
2012).   
As Delacroix and Carroll (1983) and others note, a firm’s failure releases resources such 
as intellectual property (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007), customers (Hiatt et al., 2009), and physical 
assets (Fortune & Mitchell, 2011).  In addition, the failed firm’s former employees are released 
as well (Rider, 2012a) and may be more willing to co-found or join (Roach & Sauermann, 2011) 
startups given their reduced opportunity costs (Haveman & Cohen, 1994) or disenchantment 
with traditional employment (Hachner & Granrose, 1985).   The availability of these resources 
may enable entrepreneurship by employees of existing organizations.  In fact, an important 
means for potential entrepreneurs to access the resources of a failed firm may be to join with the 
failed organization’s former employees through new venture formation.  Because many of a 
firm’s resources, such as knowledge (Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003), buyer-supplier relationships 
(Somaya, Williamson & Lorinkova, 2008), other interorganizational ties (Rider, 2012b), and 
routines (Phillips, 2002; Wezel, Cattani & Pennings, 2006), adhere to its employees, partnering 
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with a former employee of a failed organization may be an effective means for a potential 
entrepreneur to gain access to a failed rival’s resources2.   
Thus, while failures among rivals may proxy for weakness in the external environment 
that may deter entrepreneurial entry by employees of existing firms3, the causal effect of failure 
on entrepreneurial entry is likely related to the release of demand side resources (e.g. customer 
relationships) and supply side resources (e.g. employees) that stimulate entrepreneurial entry by 
employees of existing firms. As a result, the dissolution of a competitor firm may increase the 
ability of employees of existing organizations to quit their jobs to create startups.   
Hypothesis 1:  The failure of a competitor firm increases the probability that an employee 
of an existing firm exits her job to found a startup firm. 
Moderators of the Relationship between Rival Failure and Entrepreneurship 
While the previous section expands the prior literature examining the connection between 
failure and entry by moving the dependent variable (entrepreneurial entry) to the individual level 
of analysis and focusing on employees of existing firms, the proposed mechanism of resource 
release is still a fundamentally population-level concept.  In this section, I introduce individual- 
and firm-level logic from the sociology-oriented literature in organizational genealogy (e.g. 
Burton, Sørenson & Beckman, 2002; Phillips, 2002) and the economics- and strategy-oriented 
literature in employee entrepreneurship (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2004; Elfenbein et al., 2010) to 
further extend the foregoing theory about the connection between firm failure and firm creation.   
                                                 
2 In the empirical section, I address whether or not existing firm employees are founding or joining the startup firms 
with which they are affiliated.  I excise startups that are predominantly composed of employees of failed firms.  In firms 
that are founded by relatively equal numbers of employees of existing and failed firms, empirical analyses suggest that 
employees of existing and failed firms cofound startups on an equal basis. 




At least two important individual- and firm-level questions remain unanswered by the 
previous analysis, and examining them will help unpack the mechanisms underlying the first 
hypothesis.  First, are higher or lower quality employees likely to start new firms in the wake of 
competitor failure?  Second, what role does the firm’s incentive structure play in determining 
whether its employees will leave for startups following the failure of a rival organization?  The 
first question is important to answer because the quality of the individual agents reallocating the 
released resources will in turn have important implications for subsequent population-level 
outcomes.  For example, if lower quality employees create startups following competitor failure, 
the strategic and economic growth implications may be relatively minimal; these individuals may 
be merely joining startups that would have been created anyway, or they may be utilizing the 
failed firm’s lower quality resources to form startups with dim growth prospects.   The answer to 
the second question relates to how firm-level incentives affect individual-level choices to exploit 
released resources inside of new firms, the outcomes of which are eventually expressed in shifts 
in the distribution of startup organizations at the population-level.  Specifically, to the extent that 
employees of existing firms venture outside the organization to appropriate returns from 
exploitation of released resources in startups, provision of adequate incentives within existing 
firms may cause them to exploit these resources within the existing firm itself, rather than 
forming a new venture4.   
Individual Compensation 
Recent work suggests that employees in the upper tail of the ability distribution, whether 
measured by performance (Groysberg et al., 2009) or compensation (Campbell et al., 2012; 
Elfenbein et al., 2010), are more likely to enter entrepreneurship.  Higher wage employees may 
                                                 
4 A caution is worth noting before proceeding.  While Hypotheses 1 builds logic supporting a causal relationship, I lack 
exogenous instruments for the moderators discussed below.  Therefore, the following section should be interpreted as 
an exploration into the mechanisms underlying causal connection between competitor failure and entrepreneurship. 
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be better positioned to start new firms due not only to the superior skills reflected in their wages, 
but also due to their superior ability to attract complementary resources such as employees 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2005) and financial investment (Hallen, 2008). 
As a result, higher wage employees should be well-positioned to obtain the resources that 
are released following the demise of a rival firm.  For example, higher wage individuals likely 
possess better external reputations that facilitate the attraction of client and supplier relationships 
dislodged by the rival’s failure.  In addition, the skills reflected in their wages make them more 
attractive cofounders and collaborators for the former employees of dissolved firms.  
Consequently, if resource release and attraction are indeed key mechanisms underlying the 
connection between rival firm dissolution and entrepreneurial entry, employees with higher 
wages should be more likely to create startups following the demise of a competitor.   
Hypothesis 2:  The positive relationship between the failure of a competitor firm and the 
probability that an employee leaves her job with an existing firm to found a startup is 
stronger for employees with higher compensation. 
Pecuniary Opportunities within the Current Employer 
The prior section argues that failure of competitor firms releases resources that may be 
utilized by aspiring entrepreneurs to create startup organizations.  However, these resources may 
just as well be exploited internally by employees of existing firms, rather than these individuals 
choosing the more uncertain alternative of a new venture. Prior theoretical work in the 
economics of entrepreneurship suggests that the financial incentives provided by the employer 
have a strong bearing on whether or not employees choose to exploit internally recognized 
opportunities within the current employer, “push” them out of the firm into a new venture, or 
simply let them lie fallow (Anton & Yao, 1995; Hellmann, 2007; Pakes & Nitzan, 1983).  
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Analogously, the employer’s pecuniary opportunities may also help determine whether 
employees react to the release of rival resources by starting a new firm, “pulling” the released 
resources into the existing firm, or doing nothing at all. If the employer provides significant 
opportunities for pecuniary gain, the employee may be more likely to pull the resources into the 
existing firm since she may be able to personally profit from their internal utilization.  She may 
also choose to do nothing with the resources, since the significant financial gains available 
within the firm may mean that current internal opportunities are sufficient for the employee to 
earn an adequate return to her talents.  On the other hand, if the employer provides weak 
pecuniary incentives, the employee may choose to create a startup in order to maximize rent 
capture following the dissolution of a rival firm. 
The highest level of compensation within the firm, also called the firm’s wage ceiling, is 
an important indicator of the pecuniary opportunities offered by the organization (Baron & 
Bielby, 1980; Stewman & Konda, 1983). The wage ceiling provides a proxy for the highest level 
of financial attainment to which employees can aspire while working for the firm.  As a firm’s 
wage ceiling increases, its employees may have less need to enter entrepreneurship in order to 
earn larger pecuniary returns because significant returns can likely be earned within the 
organization (Sørenson & Sharkey, 2010).  Consequently, employees of firms with high wage 
ceilings may have less motivation to create a startup firm in order to exploit the resources that 
are released following the failure of competitor organizations.   
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the failure of a competitor firm and the 
probability that an employee leaves her job in an existing firm to found a startup is 




US Census Legal Services Microdata 
I examine these hypotheses in the legal services industry. This setting is ideal for several 
reasons.  First, the professional services sector, which includes legal, financial, management 
consulting, education, and health care, constitutes an increasingly important portion of the US 
economy; in 2007, services constituted 68 percent of US GDP, with professional services 
comprising about half of this activity (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008). Furthermore, human 
assets represent the most important complementary assets for firm creation in professional 
services, especially in comparison to manufacturing where physical assets are relatively more 
important (Teece, 2003).  Since the data, which I describe next,  allow me to observe all 
individuals working in the industry, I am able to track the mobility of each failed firm’s most 
important assets, which is critically important for untangling the mechanisms underpinning my 
analyses. 
I obtain data from a custom extract of the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics 
(LEHD) Project available at US Census Research Data Centers. The data are built from state-
level unemployment insurance records and several data products from different government 
agencies.  Each quarter, firms that contribute to their state’s unemployment insurance fund must 
list all employees covered by the state unemployment insurance program along with their taxable 
earnings (including partnership distributions) and some firm data.  Combining these mandatory 
records with other Census and government data products, the LEHD program constructs data 
files containing rich individual level information as well stable individual and firm identifiers.  
The latter aspect allows me to track individuals across firms and identify firm starts and exits.   
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The data identify all individuals employed in U.S. legal services in the following states: 
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin.  The earliest states entered the LEHD program in 1990, and others entered in 
subsequent years up to 1994.  The final year for all states is 2004.   
Sample construction 
I want my sample to consist of attorneys working for firms that do not fail, i.e. existing 
firms.  To ensure I focus on attorneys (the data contain all employees of law firms but do not 
note an individual’s occupation), I use the rich individual wage and age information.  First, I 
eliminate all individuals who make less than $25,000 to scrub weak attachments to the labor 
market.  Research indicates that law firms typically employ one associate per partner and one 
support staff per associate (Parkin and Baker, 2006), so I next eliminate the remaining employees 
in the bottom 33 percent of each firm’s wage distribution.  I finally require that each individual 
must make $50,000 in at least one year of the data.  The 2004 survey by the National Association 
of Legal Professionals (NALP) indicates that the median associate salary was $66,000 in that 
year (I inflate wages to the 2004 level); while NALP does not provide a standard deviation for 
this figure, the $50,000 minimum, combined with the wage percentile restriction, appears to be a 
reasonable cut off for capturing relatively lower paid associates.  At the firm level, to ensure I 
focus on existing firms, I limit my sample to firms which have been in the data for at least three 
years5, have at least five attorneys and do not exit the data within the next two years.  It is 
important to emphasize that while failed firms are included in my dataset and are used to 
construct several of the variables that I describe below, their employees are excluded from my 
                                                 
5 The first restriction (age at least three years) is necessary due to the manner in which I define the firm’s competitors.  
More information is below. 
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estimation sample - I do not examine their probability of entering entrepreneurship.  The results 
are based on employees of existing firms. 
METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES 
To ideally test the above predictions, a researcher would randomly select firms to fail and 
then observe the entrepreneurship decisions of the employees of the failed firms’ competitors.  
Such an experiment, however, is neither feasible nor socially desirable.  In the following sections 
I describe my approach to coming as close as possible to this experimental ideal. 
My unit of analysis is the individual-year.  My primary specification is a linear 
probability model with individual-firm fixed effects.  The individual-firm fixed effect controls 
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the employee-employer match as well 
as at the level of the employee and the firm for which the employee works.  As a result, I identify 
how a change in the competitor failure rate during an employee’s tenure with a given firm affects 
her decision to quit that organization and start a new firm6.  This specification also allows for 
instrumental variable estimation, which is my primary approach for dealing with omitted 
variables that might bias my results away from the experimental ideal described above.  In the 
robustness section, I present results using a multinomial logit model.  
Dependent Variables 
While the main idea of the paper relates to an employee’s decision to start a new firm, 
this decision could be related to the more general choice to change firms.  In the models that 
follow, I thus examine the probability that an individual starts a new firm as well as the 
probability that she moves to an established firm to ensure that rival failures do not merely cause 
                                                 
6 Note that the individual-firm fixed effect is more restrictive than the individual fixed effect, which would only control 
for time invariant differences in individuals (such as gender, education, and race).  Controlling for time invariant 
differences in individual-firm matches is important to the extent that individuals face different internal incentives and 
different competitive environments when working for different firms. 
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mobility generally, but rather specifically drive employees of existing firms to create startups. 
These two types of exit are mutually exclusive for any given person-year observation.  I examine 
exit at t+1 in order to ensure a causal ordering of my independent and dependent variables; in 
essence, all of the independent variables in my model are lagged by one year. 
Founding a startup (Hypothesis 1): For the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1, a dummy 
variable takes a value of one if an individual’s dominant employer changes from the previous 
year and her new employer appears in the data for the first time in that year.  To ensure that I am 
capturing significant startup firms, each must employ at least three attorneys (only about half of 
startups in the data meet this criteria)7.  The results presented below are similar, but smaller in 
magnitude, when I include smaller startup firms. 
Campbell (2005: 146) notes that administrative recodes, mergers of existing firms, or out-
of-state firms opening their first branches in a state may “look” like entrepreneurship events to 
researchers using administrative identifiers to measure new ventures.  I use flows of workers to 
eliminate these Type I errors (Benedetto, Haltiwanger, Lane & McKinney, 2007). Specifically, I 
identify administrative recodes when 80 percent or more of a new firm’s employees come from 
the same previous firm (or parent firm) and the parent firm exits the data in the current or 
following year.8  I identify merged entities as those where 80 percent or more of a new firm’s 
employees come from the same N entities and each of those N entities exit the data in the current 
or following year.  Finally, I identify out-of-state branches as firms where, in the year of the 
firm’s birth, more than 80 percent of the employees appear in the data for the first time.  After 
                                                 
7 Sole proprietorships are not included in the LEHD data, so my measure of entrepreneurship is conservative in that I 
do not capture attorneys who are “hanging out a shingle.” 
8 This restriction is particularly important for my context, as I want to ensure that I am capturing startup founding 
instead of mere mobility to a firm that is a modular piece of a pre-existing law firm that broke apart following the death 
of a partner attorney. 
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these rules are applied, none of the startups are larger than 50 employees in size, giving comfort 
that mergers, recodes, and other Type I errors have been eliminated.  
Movement to a different established firm:  This dummy variable takes the value of one if an 
individual’s dominant employer changes from the previous year and her new employer is a firm 
that already existed in the data.   
Explanatory variable 
Deaths of Rival Firms:  Before computing this variable, I need to define who is a “rival firm.” 
While the LEHD data do not contain information on law firm specialties, it nevertheless has rich 
employee mobility data that enables me to define a firm’s competitors.  To the extent that 
attorneys primarily move among a firm’s competitors, a reasonable assumption given highly 
specialized investments in human capital (Gnilson & Mookin, 1985), mobility patterns reveal the 
focal firm’s rivals. Accordingly, I define a firm’s competitors as those firms (1) which employ at 
least 5 attorneys, (2) reside in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area and state as the focal firm, 
and (3) share an employee mobility tie with the focal firm within the last three years.  An 
attorney creates a mobility tie between two firms when she leaves one firm to join the other, so a 
tie is bidirectional.  Using these data, I define an ego-centric network of competitor firms for 
each firm in my main sample.  Each firm has an average of 9.5 competitors (See Table 1).  Note 
that each firm in my sample has been in the data for at least three years to allow me to properly 
measure its competitor network.  Results are unchanged when I move the window to five years.   
To identify rival firm dissolutions, I first capture all instances where a firm has exited the 
data.  I then purge “non-failure” exits, using an approach similar to my strategy for identifying 
true firm births.  I identify mergers and recodes as above, and I identify acquisitions when a firm 
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exits the data, but 80 percent of its employees subsequently move to the same firm in the next 
two years. 
Since my hypotheses relate to the impact of firm failure due to resource release, I focus 
on failures of competitor firms where the firm experiences positive employment and total wage 
growth in the two years before exit.  A “slow sliding” firm’s exit does not necessarily result in 
the sudden release of resources that is the focus of my theoretical arguments – workers  and other 
stakeholders will depart the firm as they witness its gradual decline (Jensen, 2006; Rider, Negro 
& Roberts, 2011).  No firm experiences more than one of these sudden competitor failures in a 
given year.  Because the failure of a small firm will likely release many fewer resources than the 
failure of a large firm, I weight these sudden competitor failures by the number of attorneys 
working for the rival firm at the time of its demise.  I name the resulting variable # competitor 
firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by # attys).  I log this variable because as Table 1 shows, it 
is skewed (mean: 11.2, standard deviation: 63.1).  The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
indicates that the logged specification provides a better fit to the data than the unlogged or 
unweighted specifications, and results of hypothesis tests are similar across all three. 
Instrumental variable – unexpected deaths 
While the individual-firm fixed effect in the LPM help address the problem of time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity and lagging the independent variables provides some comfort 
around the issue of reverse causality, it is likely that time-variant, unobserved changes in a 
number of unmeasured variables may be driving both the failure of competitor firms and the 
entrepreneurship decisions of attorneys in existing organizations.  Important examples might 
include changes in the business environment such as the arrival or departure of important client 
organizations in the geographic area or decline in the quality of competitor firms.  These omitted 
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variables would likely bias my results away from confirmation of Hypothesis 1 (more 
entrepreneurship) because the failure of competitor firms would simply proxy for an economic 
decline that restricts the number of opportunities for entrepreneurship.  I use an instrumental 
variable approach to account for these unobservable factors. 
Specifically, I use the # of competitor partner attorneys that die unexpectedly as an 
instrument for my key endogenous variable: # competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted 
by # attys).   The variable measures the number of partner attorneys who die unexpectedly while 
working for competitors at time t.  I next describe why this instrument is valid, i.e. as good as 
randomly assigned, correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term 
in the primary estimation equation (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Murray, 2006).   
Like previous researchers, I focus on unexpected deaths because these deaths arguably 
provide a random source of variation9.  Deaths that follow a prolonged illness are incorporated in 
the individuals’ expectations and thus become an endogenous feature of the data.  While the 
LEHD data contain information on the exact day of death of each individual in the data if she 
dies during the sample period, I do not have access to information on the cause of death.  
Individual identities in the data are anonymous, which precludes linkages to external data 
sources such as obituaries, so I use the detailed information the LEHD provides on age and 
compensation to identify unexpected deaths.  Specifically, I count a death as unexpected when 
(a) the individual is under 60 years of age, and (b) the individual experiences positive 
seasonalized wage growth in the two quarters prior to the quarter of death10.  These criteria are 
                                                 
9 Using individual deaths as a source of exogenous variation is well established in social science research.  Aizenman and 
Kletzer (2011) examine how author death impacts forward citations to economics journal articles, Bennedsen, Perez-
Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2009) examine how CEO death impacts firm performance, Jones and Olken (2005) connect 
the death of national leaders to declines in economic growth, Johnson et al. (1985) examine stock market reaction to 
CEO deaths, while Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oetll (2012) examine how scientist death influences coauthor productivity. 
10 This means that wages in quarter Qi (where i=1,2,3,4) in year Yi are compared to wages in quarter Qi in year Yi-1, in 
order to account for fluctuations in wages owing to the yearly business cycle. 
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reasonable given the significant jump in the mortality rate in the United States for individuals in 
their 60s (6.4 percent) relative to individuals in their 50s (3.1 percent) and 40s (1.4 percent) 
(Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009).  In addition, a partner attorney’s productivity 
would likely decline during a time of illness or hospitalization, making it difficult for her to earn 
UI-covered wages during that time period.  Only a small percentage of partner attorney deaths in 
the data (about 25 percent) meet these two criteria11. 
With regard to instrument strength, there are clear reasons to anticipate that the 
unexpected death of competitor partner attorneys should be correlated with the dissolution of 
competitor firms.  Legal services firms have few assets that are not linked to the human beings 
that work for the firm (Lazega, 2001).  Therefore, partner attorney exit should increase the 
mortality of the firm because it may sever relationships with clients (Broshack, 2004) as well as 
reduce the productivity and increase the turnover (Felps et al., 2009) among other partners and 
associates that worked closely with exiting partner.  The instrument represents an exogenous 
source of partner attorney exit for rival firms.  
Anecdotally, even though Massachusetts is not represented in the sample, the power of 
the instrument is exemplified by the failure of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault (Testa, Hurwitz) 
following the unexpected death of managing partner Dick Testa in late 2002 (American Lawyer, 
2005; Dahl, 2005; Mass High Tech, 2002).  A Boston law firm that employed 400 lawyers at its 
peak, Testa, Hurwitz was forced into dissolution after the sudden death of Dick Testa left the 
firm without a guiding force.  As one legal services consultant noted “when [Testa] suddenly 
died, it was too much of a shock,” (Dahl, 2005).  Most of the attorneys from the private equity 
group, Testa’s primary practice area and the firm’s core expertise, left the firm, and the 
                                                 
11 Though not directly comparable, my set of criteria seem to be about as restrictive as Azoulay et al. (2010) who impose 
an age cutoff of 67 and find that about 45% of their deceased scientists pass away suddenly. 
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remaining attorneys could not meet the significant rent on the firm’s Boston headquarters, 
forcing the firm to dissolve. 
With regard to the exclusion restriction, I also expect these instruments to be uncorrelated 
with the error term in the LPM predicting employee entrepreneurship.  While the death of partner 
attorneys working for other firms may release resources for potential entrepreneurs, I expect that 
the marginal effect of these shocks on the entrepreneurship decisions of the attorneys in my 
sample should be relatively small since these partners are working in other organizations.  In 
effect, my assumption is that—conditional on all of my control variables—partner attorney 
deaths will only stimulate entrepreneurship by individuals working for rivals when the death is 
significant enough to result in the dissolution of the partner’s firm and the release of its 
constituent resources.  I underscore a few key controls in the following section.   
Other Independent Variables 
Annual earnings:  The moderator for Hypothesis 2, earnings include all forms of taxable 
compensation that an employee received in a given calendar year including salary, bonuses 
(including partnership distributions that are crucial in legal services), and other reported income. 
Maximum annual earnings in the firm (wage ceiling): The moderator for Hypothesis 3, the 
firm’s wage ceiling measures the highest wage paid to an employee in the current year (Sørenson 
& Sharkey, 2010). 
I include control variables at the individual, firm, and competitive environment levels of 
analysis.   At the individual level, in my primary models I utilize employee-employer fixed 
effects, so variables that do not vary at the level of the employee-employer match, such as 
gender, race and education, drop out of the model.  I also include age, age2 in all models.  I 
control for tenure as flexibly as possible:  a dummy for each of 1-14 years of same-firm tenure. 
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The LEHD data do not contain information on whether a particular worker is an associate 
or partner.  However, I rely on my rich wage and demographic data to impute partner status.  
Recent work analyzing a representative national sample of attorneys from the comprehensive 
Martindale Hubbell database suggests that attorneys usually enter law school at age 22 and take 
about nine years to advance to partner (Parkin & Baker, 2006).  Furthermore, law firms during 
the time period covered by my data typically have a leverage ratio of one associate per partner, 
regardless of firm size (Parkin & Baker, 2006).  Consequently, I define a partner as an employee 
who is age 34 or greater and lies in the upper 50 percent of the firm’s earnings distribution (after 
removing the bottom 33 percent of the firm’s wage distribution to eliminate non-attorneys).  
Results are robust from age 33 to 36 and for percentile cutoffs of 66 percent and 75 percent.   I 
indicate whether an individual is a partner using a dummy variable.  This definition of partner is 
also used in the calculation of the instrumental variable. 
At the firm level, I include size (# of attorneys), quality (revenue per attorney), and 
compensation structure (coefficient of variation in earnings), as prior work shows each of these 
to be correlated with mobility and entrepreneurship decisions, and each could plausibly be 
associated with the failure of competitor firms.  I control for size using dummy variables for firm 
size categories of 5-10, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100, 101-500 and 500+ sized firms, which conform to 
the categories used by the National Association of Legal Professionals (NALP).  The coefficients 
on these dummies (as well as those for tenure) are not reported owing to their lack of theoretical 
interest and Census disclosure concerns around dichotomous variables.  I further include the # of 
attorneys hired from failed competitors, which ensures that attorneys hired from failed rivals do 
not “push” entrepreneurs out of their firms. 
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I include a number of important controls related to the focal firm’s rivals.  I include the 
size (# of competitor firms) and quality (avg revenue per attorney, weighted by competitor firm 
size) of the firm’s competitor network.  While my key explanatory variable focuses on the post-
growth failure of competitor firms, I also include the # competitor firms that fail after decline 
(weighted by # of attys).  To account for an aging human asset base that might create correlation 
between my DV and instruments via openings in the vacancy chain, I include the avg age of 
competitor attorneys. To account for larger trends in mobility and entrepreneurship that might 
drive competitor failure and individual decisions to create startups, I include percent competitor 
turnover rate and percent competitor startup rate.  These variables also help account for changes 
in the vacancy chain, perhaps owing to rival partner death, that might create correlation between 
my DV and instruments.  I also include the number of law firms in the firm’s MSA and its 
squared term (density). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.   The average attorney in the data is about 
42 years old, makes about $114,000 ($2004), and has spent the last four years with her current 
firm (though tenure is left censored).  Another variable of note is the wage ceiling, which 
averages $500,000. Mobility to an established firm is about three times as likely as creation of a 
new venture. 
Table 2 provides the results of the linear probability models with endogenous regressors.   
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West standard errors clustered by 
employee-employer dyads are provided.  Coefficients can be interpreted as the correlation 
between the independent and dependent variables.  Models 1 and 3 report the effect of rival 
failure on entrepreneurship and mobility decisions of employees of existing firms.  Model 1 
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shows that increased rival failure is negatively correlated with entrepreneurship, while Model 3 
provides results consistent with Haveman and Cohen (1994):  increased rival failure is also 
negatively correlated with mobility to established firms in the industry.  In Models 2 & 4, the 
failures are split into “expected” (preceded by decline in headcount and wages) and 
“unexpected” (preceded by growth) and reveal similar negative correlations.  Interestingly, most 
of the variation is due to “unexpected” failures.  
These results are consistent with the idea that non-random competitor failures proxy for 
weakness in the business environment rather than the release of resources.  If the primary effect 
of non-random rival failures were indeed released resources, one would expect to see a negative 
correlation with mobility - unemployed workers would “crowd out” the movement of workers in 
existing firms (Haveman & Cohen, 1994) - and a positive effect on entrepreneurship as 
employees in existing firms would join with these workers in startups or use other resources to 
create new firms (e.g. Delacroix & Carroll, 1983). 
Table 3 contains the results of the 2SLS estimation, which attempts to account for 
unobserved variation in the business environment.   The first stage equation in Model 1, which 
regresses the endogenous variable on the instrument and covariates, provides empirical support 
for instrument strength - the instrument is positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
the endogenous variable.  In addition, the instrument also has considerable economic 
significance: the death of a rival partner attorney increases the number of attorneys released by 
unexpected rival failure by about 2 percent of the sample mean (.0221/1.505 = 2.1 percent).   In 
unreported results using the unlogged version of the endogenous variable, the death of a rival 
partner attorney is associated with the release of 100.3 attorneys via unexpected competitor 
failure, providing further support for the practical significance of the instrument.  The statistic for 
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Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test of instrument weakness using the  Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
Wald F-statistic  (193.867), strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak at the 
critical value of 16.38 for 2SLS estimates with one instrument and one endogenous variable.  
The Angrist-Pischke (2009) multivariate F-statistic of 128.63 also rejects the null hypothesis of 
instrument weakness.  Thus, the instrument appears to be both practically and statistically strong. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 3 provide the focal results of the paper by using 2SLS 
estimation of linear probability models with employee-employer fixed effects and HAC standard 
errors clustered by employee-employer dyad.  They show the exogenous variation supplied by 
the instrument variable produces significantly different results than in Table 15.  Model 2 
displays the results for new venture creation.  Not only does the coefficient attain statistical 
significance at the .001 level, it also becomes practically larger and changes signs from negative 
to positive as compared to the endogenous estimates in Table 3 (from -0.002 to 0.038).   The 
practical significance of the effect is striking:  the failure of a rival firm with 11 attorneys (the 
average size of a failed firm in the data) causes a 3.9 percent marginal increase in the probability 
that an attorney will found a startup (log(11)*.0382 = .0397).  Since the average probability that 
an attorney in the sample founds a startup in a given year is 0.9 percent, this 3.9 percent marginal 
increase represents a 351 percent increase as compared to the sample mean ([3.97-.9]/.9).   This 
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE; [Imbens & Angrist, 1994]), shows that when rival 
partner death causes the dissolution of a rival firm, employees of existing firms receive a 
significant push to start a firm.   
The results for mobility in Model 3, in line with the endogenous estimates of Table 3 and 
Haveman and Cohen (1994), show that unexpected competitor failure reduces mobility.  
However, while the magnitude of the coefficient is considerably larger than the endogenous 
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estimates of Table 3 (-0.02 versus -0.001) it does not attain statistical significance (p-value=.55).  
It appears that when accounting for unobservables, competitor failure does not have a significant 
causal effect on mobility to established firms in this context.   
In order to test the interactions implied by H2 and H3 while retaining the instrumental 
variable estimation of rival failure, I follow prior research by using the predicted values from the 
first stage regression in place of the endogenous variable (e.g. Samila & Sorenson, 2011) and 
interacting this value with the moderators of interest.  Results should be interpreted carefully.  
While OLS estimates the coefficients from this approach correctly, it does not estimate correct 
standard errors, because 2SLS constructs the residual variance estimator using the original 
endogenous regressor (which is correct), while OLS uses the first stage fitted values (which is 
not - Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 188).  To overcome this issue, I construct the standard errors 
using a bootstrap with 10,000 repetitions, following Samila and Sorenson (2011).  While still 
imperfect, this approach relaxes the parametric assumptions associated with estimating 
traditional standard errors. 
Results in Table 4 provide support for H2 and H3.  Model 1 replicates the results in 
Model 2 of Table 3 using the manual two-stage OLS approach described above – reassuringly, 
the coefficient estimates are identical and the bootstrapped standard errors are quite similar to 
those provided by 2SLS in Model 2 of Table 3.  In Model 2 of Table 4, the interaction between 
Annual earnings and # competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys) is 
positive and significant at the 10 percent level for a two-tailed test, while the interaction 
including the square of annual earnings is not significant.  In Model 3 of Table 4, the interaction 
between Maximum earnings within the firm (wage ceiling) and # competitor firms that fail 
unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys) is negative and significant at the .001 percent level for a 
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two-tailed test.  Both interactions retain or increase their significance when simultaneously 
included in Model 4, providing support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.   
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the practical significance of the individual earnings and 
wage ceiling interactions, respectively.  When individual earnings increase one standard 
deviation above the mean (from about $100,000 to about $350,000) the marginal effect of # 
competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by # attys) increases from about .036 to about 
.038, an increase of 5.5 percent.  When the maximum wage offered by the current employer 
doubles from the mean (from about $500,000 to about $1,000,000) the marginal effect of # 
competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by # attys) decreases from about .018 to about 
.004, a decrease of about 77 percent.  Confidence intervals in Figure 2 indicate that rival failure 
no longer affects entrepreneurship when the wage ceiling exceeds about $650,000.  Thus, the 
incentives offered by the firm have a very strong effect on startup creation following competitor 
failure. 
Robustness tests 
While the two-stage least squares approach detailed in the previous section provides 
numerous advantages, such as the inclusion of fixed effects, it makes two key assumptions that 
need to be examined.  First, because I estimate separate models for mobility to established firms 
and startups, I am assuming that the decision to start a new firm is independent of the decision to 
exit the organization.  Second, when I use the death of rival partner attorneys as an instrument 
for the failure of rival firms, I am assuming that these partner attorneys are employed by one of 
the rival firms that dissolve in the year of the attorney’s death.  It is possible that one rival may 
experience the death of a partner while a different rival fails. 
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I address both of these assumptions by splitting my key endogenous variable into two 
groups –competitor firms that fail unexpectedly following the death of a partner attorney and 
competitor failures that are not preceded by the death of a partner attorney.  Because these events 
are relatively rare in my data (15 firms fail unexpectedly following the unexpected death of a 
partner attorney; each firm has between 5 and 100 lawyers), Census disclosure requirements 
become a concern.  To overcome this issue, I expand my definition of competitor firms by an 
additional degree of separation in the mobility network.  Previously, I defined competitors quite 
restrictively, using only firms who share a direct employee mobility tie with the focal firm.  In 
the results presented in Tables 5-7, I also include those firms with a direct mobility tie to the 
firms with which the focal firm has a direct mobility tie (in essence, “competitors of the firm’s 
competitors” by the original definition).  This expansion allows the 15 firms that fail 
unexpectedly to “treat” a larger number of individuals in the sample, thus obviating Census 
disclosure concerns, while still providing similar results to those with the more restrictive 
definition of competitors.   The variables are named Competitor firm (large set) fails 
unexpectedly after death of partner atty(s) and # competitor firms (large set) that fail 
unexpectedly, no death of partner atty to reflect the increased size of the competitor network.   
The identifying assumption underlying this approach is that the first variable (Competitor 
firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after death of partner atty(s)) is essentially random.   If we see 
a firm with two years of positive wage and employment growth exit from the data after at least 
one of its partner attorneys dies unexpectedly, I assume that this surprising dissolution was 
triggered by the unexpected, random death of the partner, similar to how the unexpected death of 
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Dick Testa spurred the dissolution of Testa, Hurwtiz12.   If this variable is indeed random, I can 
include it in standard reduced form regression models and its coefficient will have a causal 
interpretation.  This is the approach that I take in Tables 5-7. 
Table 5 replicates the main effect results in a multinomial logit model, which allows 
empirically acknowledgement of the interdependence between the general decision to exit the 
firm and the specific choice of founding a startup, but does not allow for fixed effect estimation.  
The employee can choose to remain with the current firm, join an established firm, found a 
startup, or exit the data.  Staying with the current firm is the reference category; results for 
exiting the data are not shown for brevity.  Exits from the data can include retirement, movement 
to a state not covered by the data, or transition to an non-legal services industry, such as an in-
house counsel position.   
Table 5 shows that rival failures preceded by the death of a partner have a statistically 
and economically strong effect on the decision to form a startup but do not have a statistically 
significant effect on mobility to established firms.  Indeed, one of these failures increases the 
odds that an attorney will leave for a startup versus stay with the current firm by a factor of 8 to 
113.  Note that the Hausman test accepts the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption 
for each outcome, obviating the need for a nested logit or multinomial probit. 
Results for interactions with the multinomial logit are presented in Table 6.  Interpreting 
these coefficients is difficult, owing to the link functions and implicit interactions between all 
variables in non-linear models (Hoetker, 2007).  In particular, the p-values of interaction terms 
are essentially meaningless due to the implicit interactions between each of the variables, and so 
                                                 
12 While weaker firms maybe more likely than stronger firms to dissolve following a partner’s death, this bias will provide 
a conservative test of my hypotheses because the resources released by these failures should be of lower quality and thus 
result in fewer opportunities for entrepreneurship.     
13 A Wald test confirms that rival failures preceded by partner death have a stronger impact on entrepreneurship 
probability than failures not preceded by death (Chi-sq value of 201.2, significant at .001% level). Further, these 
“exogenous” failures have a stronger effect on startup creation than established firm mobility (218.47; <.001). 
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I rely on likelihood ratio (LR) tests. Indeed, while Model 2 in Table 6 shows that the interaction 
term between annual earnings and competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after death of 
partner atty(s) is positive but not statistically significant, the likelihood ratio test comparing 
Model 2 to Model 1 is significant at the 5 percent level, and supports H2 in this specification.  
The interaction between wage ceiling and competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after 
death of partner atty(s) is negative and statistically significant, and the model fit improves 
significantly from Model 3 to Model 1.  Therefore, H3 is supported.  
Finally, Table 7 enters the new variables capturing “exogenous” failures in linear 
probability models predicting mobility and entrepreneurship.  While these models do not 
acknowledge the interdependence of entrepreneurship and mobility, they have the benefit of 
fixed effects.  In Model 2, failures preceded by the deaths of partner attorneys increase the 
probability of entrepreneurship by .016 (significant at the .001 percent level), nearly doubling the 
mean probability of .0088, replicating the economically significant impact we saw in the 2SLS 
estimation14.  In Model 4, unexpected rival firm failure that is preceded by partner death does not 
have a statistically or practically significant effect on mobility to established firms. Importantly, 
the point estimates of the coefficients on Competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after 
death of partner atty(s) do not change much when we add control variables to the models. This 
provides some empirical support for the assumption that these failures are essentially random 
(Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011):  the magnitudes of the coefficients appear to be relatively 
independent of the characteristics of the individual, her firm, or her competitive environment.  
Models with interaction terms are not provided for sake of brevity – interaction terms indicate 
                                                 
14 A Wald test confirms that rival failures preceded by partner death have a stronger impact on entrepreneurship 
probability than failures not preceded by death (Chi-sq value of 31.74, significant at .001% level) 
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that H2 (earnings) is not supported in this specification while H3 (wage ceiling) again receives 
strong support. 
While the above results and robustness tests lend strong support to the idea that rival firm 
failure releases resources that enable existing firm employees to start new firms, two important 
questions still need to be addressed.  First, what type of resources drive entrepreneurial entry in 
this industry?  Second, are employees of existing firms actually founding startups, or are they 
merely joining “new” firms that are merely modular pieces of the recently failed organizations?  
Qualitative interviews and the fine-grained nature of the data allow me to examine both. 
What types of resources drive entrepreneurial entry in the sample? 
Popular press articles (e.g. Hurley 2009) and qualitative interviews with attorneys 
indicate that there are two key resource constraints that potential entrepreneurs must overcome in 
the legal services industry:  a significant client “book” and availability of co-founders or joiners 
who are interested in working in startup firms.  The failure of a law firm precipitated by the 
death of one of its partners may release both types of resources into the marketplace.  For 
example, interviewees indicated that when Testa, Hurwitz dissolved following Dick Testa’s 
death, clients tied primarily to Testa himself shifted some work to other law firms with whom 
clients had existing relationships.  This sudden abundance of business might provide an attorney 
at one of these rivals with a large enough client book to form her own firm.  At the same time, 
the Testa, Hurwitz’s attorneys had to find other employment options when the firm dissolved, 
and some moved to startups with colleagues who previously worked for existing rivals. 
While I do not have data on the clients served by the anonymized firms in the data, the 
rich employee mobility data provide a window for assessing the relative importance of 
cofounders or joiners.  Examining the employees of existing organizations who create startups in 
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the period following the “exogenous” failure of a rival (i.e. # Competitor firms (large set) that 
fail unexpectedly following death of partner attorney = 1), I find that a most of these individuals 
create startups that also include former employees of the failed organization, rather than startups 
with only former employees of existing firms.  A t-test for the difference between these two 
percentages has a p-value of less than .05.  This suggests that a release of human assets in the 
form of cofounders and joiners are the key mechanism, though it is important to keep in mind 
that one of the key inputs provided by cofounders may be client relationships. 
Who leads post-failure startups – employees of existing or failed organizations? 
The foregoing theory mainly centers on the entrepreneurial action taken by employees of 
existing firms following the failure of rival organizations.  However, the prior section shows that 
most of these startups contain employees of healthy firms and employees of failed firms.  What 
if employees of healthy firms are merely lower level employees who are joining startups created 
by employees of failed firms?  The support for H2 across most of the specifications above helps 
alleviate this concern, since it suggests that higher wage employees are more likely to create 
startups following rival failure.  In addition, it is important to keep in mind that startups where 80 
percent of the founding employees matriculate from the same firm are excised from the data in 
order to exclude from the startup population “new” firms that are merely modular pieces of 
recently failed organizations.  If rival failure creates “false” startups, the results in Table 2 that 
indicate a negative association with endogenous rival failures and startup activity by employees 
of existing firms provides some confidence that this cleaning process has worked effectively.    
I also performed additional regression analysis to compare the demographic 
characteristics of founders from existing firms to the demographic characteristics of founders 
from failed firms.  First, I limited the sample to those startups formed in the wake of 
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“exogenous” failures which contained founders from both existing and failed organizations.  
Then I estimated conditional logit models where the DV=1 when the founder hailed from a failed 
organization and DV=0 when the founder hailed from an existing organization.  Independent 
variables included a variety of individual characteristics, including wage at the previous firm, 
wage in the first year of the startup’s existence, wage in the second year of the startup’s 
existence, partner status in the previous firm, partner status in the startup firm, age at founding, 
gender, and race.  Results (not disclosed due to the small sample size) show that founders hailing 
from failed organizations were more likely to have been a partner in their previous organization 
and also earned slightly higher wages in their previous organization as compared to employees 
hailing from existing firms.  However, wage and partner attainment outcomes experienced at the 
startup were economically and statistically the same across both groups, and the other 
demographic variables such as age and gender were also not significantly different.  This 
suggests that employees from existing and failed firms created startups on a relatively equal 
basis.  Combining this analysis with the previous section suggests that the primary resource 
constraint relaxed by rival failure is the availability of co-founders who can help each other pool 
uncertainty and resources inside of startup firms (Wasserman, 2012). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Using confidential, employee-employer linked microdata on the legal services industry 
from the US Census Bureau, this paper suggests that the failure of rival organizations increases 
the probability that employees of existing firms quit their jobs to start new ventures (Hypothesis 
1).  I use the unexpected deaths of partner attorneys working for rival firms as an instrument for 
the failures of the firms that employ them, which helps me overcome the omitted variable 
problems typically present research that uses firm failure as an independent variable.  The 
41 
 
relationship is particularly strong for employees with higher wages (Hypothesis 2) and 
employees working for firms with weaker pecuniary incentives (Hypothesis 3).  Supplementary 
analyses suggest that the main causal driver of entrepreneurial entry by employees of existing 
firms is the greater availability of co-founders in the form of employees of failed organizations.   
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has a number of limitations that caution against over-generalizing its findings 
but also open up interesting avenues for future research.  The most important limitation is the 
context.  Legal services has a number of characteristics that make it an appealing empirical 
laboratory for this study:  e.g. relatively small firms, low barriers to mobility and 
entrepreneurship, primacy of human assets.  The findings here are likely to be broadly applicable 
to other service industries which make up about 68 percent of the US economy (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2008), including important knowledge-based services such as accounting, 
consulting, software development, and the like.  However, in industries with higher barriers to 
entry, managerial death may be less likely to spur the firm’s dissolution and rival firm 
dissolution may be less likely to spur entrepreneurship by employees in existing firms.    
Consequently, using upper level manager death as an instrument for firm death may not 
be advisable in industries where firms are larger and physical assets are more important.  The 
ability of such firms to endure following the death of an upper level manager may render the 
instruments too weak to be valid.  In addition, industries where technological change is an 
important impetus for firm failure may show different results.  Despite these limitations, I do not 
expect the direction of the hypotheses in this study to change in a different empirical context, 
though I do expect the economic significance of the hypothesized effects to be smaller in 
industries where barriers to entrepreneurship are higher.  Future work examining industry-level 
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heterogeneity in the effect of rival failure on entrepreneurship will provide an important 
extension to the initial progress made in this manuscript.  For example, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the release of human capital from the closure of many NASA facilities is spurring 
entrepreneurship in high tech industries as former NASA employees become key “joiners” of 
Silicon Valley startups (Kharif, 2012). 
Another avenue for future work relates to the industry or system-level efficiency 
outcomes related to entrepreneurship following firm failure.  Pe’er and Vertinsky (2008) provide 
some suggestive evidence that new firms that are formed in the wake of the dissolution of 
existing firms are more efficient that the ones that they replace. The current study implies that 
these new firms may consist of three groups:  those that only contain employees of the failed 
firms, those that only contain employees of existing firms, and those that contain a mixture of the 
two.  Examining firm and individual-level productivity differences between these three types 
may provide important hints about who drives the macro-level growth following firm failure. 
Another important question related to creative destruction that cannot be answered with 
the current data is whether the new firms that are formed in the wake of rival dissolution provide 
products or services that are significantly more novel than other startups.  For example, though I 
find some evidence in unreported results that rival dissolution has a stronger influence on the 
founding of larger startups than smaller startups, I cannot measure whether the new law firms 
implement business models or client services that are more innovative than other members of the 
industry.  Data with fine-grained measures of firm routines or product characteristics would 




Despite these limitations, the paper provides a unique contribution to the literature, 
primarily through counterintuitive findings related to spillovers from organizational failure at the 
individual and firm levels of analysis.  At the individual level, prior scholars have viewed rival 
failure as a negative event for employees of existing organizations, as rival failure eliminates a 
labor market destination and creates labor market competition via the release of the failed firm’s 
employees (Haveman & Cohen, 1994).  In this paper, I provide the insight that rival failure can 
provide positive spillovers for employees of existing firms because it releases resources that may 
help these individuals start new ventures.  Most prominently, employees of failed firms may be 
labor market collaborators rather than labor market competitors for employees of existing firms 
when we expand the notion of the labor market to include startups. 
At the firm level, prior work in strategy and economics generally views rival failure as a 
positive strategic outcome that allows existing firms to increase market power—especially in 
mature industries like legal services, the context of this study.  While work in organizational 
sociology recognizes that rival failure can harm existing firms by decreasing the legitimacy of 
the industry, the current paper points out a previously unarticulated negative spillover from rival 
failure:  the sudden availability of resources may spur the firm’s own employees to exit the 
organization to found competing new ventures.  Since progeny firms often implement similar 
routines and occupy similar market niches as their parent firms (Phillips, 2002), these new 
ventures may even be more challenging rivals than the failed firms that they replace. 
By examining individual behavior and leveraging exogenous variation in the failure of 
firms, the study also untangles a key debate in the literature connecting firm failure to 
entrepreneurship.  While prior studies at the population level have shown negative (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990; Land et al., 1994; Halliday et al., 1987) and positive correlations (Delacroix & 
44 
 
Carroll, 1983; Dunne et al., 1984;  Hiatt et al., 2009; Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008) between failure 
and entry, this study uses an instrumental variable design to suggest that negative correlations are 
probably due to an omitted variable bias reflecting environmental weakness that causes the 
failure of firms and retards entrepreneurship. Similarly, for scholars interested in the positive 
spillovers resulting from firm failure (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Knott & Posen, 2005), the 
paper provides some of the first causal evidence that the death of one firm leads to the birth of 
others.   
While most studies in the classic entrepreneurship and mobility tradition view employees 
as conduits of knowledge whose movement decisions are shaped mainly by firm level factors 
(e.g. Sørenson, 2007), the current study adds to a growing literature that considers the influence 
of the external environment on individuals’ entrepreneurship decisions (Marx, Strumsky & 
Fleming, 2009; Saxenian, 1994).  In particular, I extend Sorenson & Stuart (2003), who 
document how financial capital liquidity events such as acquisitions and IPOs drive 
entrepreneurship at the MSA level of analysis by providing the complementary insight that rival 
failure creates a human resource liquidity event that may drive individuals working for existing 
firms to enter entrepreneurship. 
The conclusions reached in this study at the environmental level somewhat parallel those 
reached by Agarwal et al. (2004) at the firm level.  Those authors find that knowledge-rich firms 
tend to create spinouts when the firm’s knowledge is under-utilized.  Similarly, I find in this 
study that an increase in resource munificence in the external environment leads to an increase in 
spinout creation, but that firms may mollify this effect when they provide their employees with 
stronger pecuniary incentives.  The study thus underscores how human resource practices—
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along with knowledge utilization—may be an important organizational lever for managers 
seeking to encourage employees to exploit resources and opportunities within firm boundaries.   
In a similar way, by focusing on the failure of rival firms as an impetus for 
entrepreneurship, the current paper provides a slightly different spin on Saxeninan’s (1994: 111) 
discussion of tolerance for failure and the success of the entrepreneurial cluster in Silicon Valley: 
Although many individual firms did not survive [the] competitive struggles, the 
region as a whole thrived . . . The continuous recombination of differently specialized 
resources in turn strengthened the region’s industrial fabric . . .There is a unique 
atmosphere here that continually revitalizes itself by virtue of the fact that today’s 
collective understandings are informed by yesterday’s frustrations and modified by 
tomorrow’s recombinations . . . Learning occurs through these recombinations.  No 
other geographic area creates recombination so effectively with so little disruption.   
Thus, while Saxenian (1994) mainly focuses on how Silicon Valley’s unique atmosphere of 
experimentation encourages entrepreneurship by permitting individuals who worked for failed 
enterprises to avoid stigma and continue to participate in the economic community, the results in 
the current paper suggest that the failure of rival firms provides opportunities for entry by 
employees of existing organizations, primarily through increased availability of cofounders.   
Finally, the paper extends our knowledge about connection between the macro environment and 
individual careers (e.g. Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010).  While potential positive macro-level 
implications resulting from the resource reallocation following a firm’s failure, such as increases 
in efficiency and long run job creation, are difficult to measure accurately, the paper illuminates 
the micro-level benefits for would-be entrepreneurs working for existing organizations.  While 
an organization’s failure may represent a negative outcome for its own employees, its demise 
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may increase welfare for other workers by changing the structure of the market and providing 
these individuals with opportunities to obtain better job matches (Jovanovic, 1979) by working 
for a startup.  While it may be unlikely that the short-run aggregate effect on welfare is positive 
(i.e. that the initial positive effect for entrepreneurs exceeds the initial negative impact for 
unemployed workers), a long-run increase may be possible if these superior matches result in 





DOES THE EXIT OF A HIGHLY PAID 
WOMAN FROM THE FIRM INCREASE 
OR DECREASE HER FEMALE 
COLLEAGUES’ EARNINGS? EVIDENCE 
FROM UNEXPECTED DEATHS IN 
LEGAL SERVICES 
Scholars interested in individual career attainment have long studied how changing jobs 
affects an employee’s career outcomes.  It is clear that professional fortunes often wax and wane 
as a result of inter-firm mobility (Spilerman, 1977), as changing employers appears to have 
indelible effects on important outcomes like earnings (Bidwell, 2011) and status attainment 
(Rider, 2012; Wegener, 1991).   However, while we have begun to grasp the importance of 
mobility for the person who exits a firm, we have largely neglected the outcomes for the former 
colleagues that the departing individual leaves behind.  In an economy increasingly defined by 
interorganizational career ladders (Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010) and correspondingly high rates of 
inter-firm mobility, it is important to understand how the one individual’s departure affects the 
career outcomes of his or her colleagues.   
48 
 
 This issue may be particularly salient for members of underrepresented groups within an 
organization.  If a highly paid member of an underrepresented group, such as a female executive, 
departs the organization, the consequences for the women she leaves behind are unclear.  On the 
one hand, organizational mentors are crucial inputs for career success (Briscoe & Kellogg, 
2011), and to the extent that homophily drives the sorting of mentoring relationships 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001), the departure of an important ally could weaken the 
remaining individual’s position in the firm.  On the other hand, legitimacy concerns may dictate 
that an organization retain a minimum number of members from underrepresented groups 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and the departure of a colleague may cause the bargaining power of 
remaining individuals to increase, allowing them to capture more value. 
In this paper, we examine this puzzle through the lens of gender earnings inequality in 
American legal services firms.  How do the average earnings of female attorneys change when a 
highly paid woman exits a law firm?  The answer is not clear ex ante.  If she were an important 
mentor and advocate for their careers within the firm (Kay and Wallace, 2009), the exit of a 
highly paid woman may decrease the productivity and bargaining power (and hence earnings) of 
her female colleagues.  However, in order to maintain legitimacy with clients (Beckman & 
Phillips, 2005) and potential employees (Ely & Thomas, 2001), law firms may have an incentive 
to maintain a threshold number of women in the upper part of the firm’s pay distribution.  
Consequently, the departure of a highly paid female may create opportunities for remaining 
women to capture higher earnings, either via deeper connections with clients or by ascension 
through the organizational hierarchy.   
 We use unique data and a novel empirical design to distinguish between these two 
theoretical predictions.   Using confidential and comprehensive employer-employee matched 
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microdata on the legal services industry from the US Census Bureau, we analyze how attorneys’ 
earnings change after a highly paid colleague dies unexpectedly. While the process that 
determines traditional turnover is likely highly interrelated with the process that determines 
colleague earnings, unexpected deaths are arguably randomly assigned. Matching firms that 
experience a death to observably equivalent firms that do not, our quasi-experimental set up 
allows us to make relatively credible causal inferences about the impact of highly paid attorney 
exit on the earnings of colleagues who remain with the organization. 
The results are striking.  Following a highly paid colleague’s death, the average earnings 
of other members of the firm increase about 3% relative to the control group.  This increase may 
occur because surviving members of the firm inherit the client work that was formerly completed 
by the deceased attorney.  The deeper insight comes when we examine how the gender of the 
deceased and the gender of the surviving attorney moderate this result.  Men experience a 
relatively small increase in earnings when a colleague passes away, and this increase is not 
dependent on whether the deceased person is male or female.  Women, on the other hand, 
experience a large (8%) increase in earnings after a female colleague passes away; this increase 
is significantly larger than what women experience when the deceased colleague is male.    
Examining moderators of this key relationship in order to pin down the mechanisms at 
play, we find that the result is stronger when the surviving female attorney is higher in the firm’s 
earnings distribution at the time of her colleague’s death, older then her deceased female 
colleague, or higher in the firm’s earning distribution than her deceased female colleague.  These 
results suggest that highly paid women benefit from the death of their highly paid female 
colleagues. This may be a result of gender homophily (Beckman & Phillips, 2005; McPherson et 
al., 2001), where clients of the deceased woman are more likely to migrate to her female 
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coworkers.  It may also suggest that an increase in bargaining power following a highly paid 
woman’s death may flow most directly to other highly paid women, whose visibility makes them 
important for the firm’s maintenance of legitimacy in a marketplace that may have preferences 
for diversity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).   
 In the next section, we build theory for each of the opposing predictions regarding the 
direction that female wages will move when a highly paid woman exits a law firm.  We then 
describe the data and empirical design and present the main results.  We conclude with additional 
analyses that attempt to pin down mechanisms behind the focal results.  We finally discuss the 
limitations of the study and its contributions and implications for research at the intersection of 
organization theory, gender inequality, and individual careers. 
Exit of a Highly Paid Female Colleague and Changes in Women’s Earnings – Competing 
Predictions 
 
Extant theory in the organizations literature provides equally plausible opposing predictions 
about whether the exit of a highly paid woman from a law firm will depress or enhance the 
earnings of the women who remain with the organization.  The lack of theoretical unanimity on 
this point reflects the broader complexity of gender issues in organizations.  In the following two 
sections, we articulate the theoretical rationale and mechanisms underpinning each of the 
competing predictions.  To summarize the two viewpoints, if we expect women’s earnings to 
decline upon the departure of a highly paid female colleague, the primary reason may be the loss 
of a mentor or advocate.  On the other hand, if we expect women’s earnings to increase, the root 
cause may be an increase in bargaining power – if external audiences demand that law firms 
maintain gender diversity in order to remain legitimate, the remaining women in the firm may be 
able to capture more value.  Given the broad range of researchers who have contributed to the 
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literature examining the role of gender in organizations, we draw on work with roots in 
sociological, psychological, and economic traditions.    
Why Exit of a Highly Paid Female May Decrease the Earnings of Women Who Remain 
with the Firm 
 
A growing literature documents a phenomenon of “women helping women” in 
organizations. This work suggests that the exit of a highly paid female attorney from a law firm 
may decrease the earnings of the women who remain with the firm by depressing their ability to 
both create and capture value.  Value creation explanations center on why females in the upper 
levels of the firm may enhance the productivity of the other women in the organization.  If a 
highly paid female exits the firm, the other women in the firm may experience a decline in their 
earnings accompanying a decline in productivity.  Value capture explanations examine how sets 
of coalitions bargain for the total value created by the firm.  In this point of view, women in the 
firm may experience a decline in their earnings because the bargaining power of their coalition 
has been weakened by their colleague’s exit.   
 With regard to enhancements in value creation, a highly paid woman may enhance the 
productivity of her female colleagues primarily by providing mentoring.  Drawing on homophily 
arguments (McPherson et al., 2001), prior research shows that gender similarity is a key 
dimension determining the formation and value of mentor-mentee relationships (Kay & Wallace, 
2009), particularly that women are the mostly likely and most effective mentors for other women  
(O’Neill & Blake-Beard, 2002).  Mentees receive a number of positive benefits, including skill 
development, elucidation of organizational norms, and introductions to valuable interpersonal 
relationships both within and outside the organization (e.g. Whitley, Dougherty, Dreher, 1991).  
Underrepresented groups, such as women in law firms, tend to especially derive benefits from 
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mentoring (Scandura & Ragins, 1993), precisely because they may lack the natural homphily-
driven connections possessed by larger groups (Kanter, 1977).   
Law firms host many studies of mentoring (e.g. Briscoe & Kellogg, 2011; Kay & 
Wallace, 2009), underscoring the importance of the practice in this setting.  For example, if a 
highly paid woman exits a law firm, her female mentees may have difficulty activating and 
extending their interpersonal networks, which are vital for marshalling the resources necessary to 
serve clients.  In addition, they may miss opportunities to work on important projects, losing the 
chance to develop valuable skills and contacts that will help them later in their careers.   Each of 
these losses may drive a decline in a woman’s productivity and an associated dip in her earnings 
if a highly paid woman exits the firm. 
 In addition to creating value via mentoring, a highly paid woman may also help the other 
women in the law firm capture more of the value that they create.  Here, the essence of the idea 
is that gender may be an important organizational fault line (Lau & Murningham, 1998) that 
determines in-group advocacy for salary, bonuses, and promotions.  Prior work finds evidence 
suggestive of this phenomenon.  For example, Matsa and Miller (2012) document a positive 
correlation between female board representation and subsequent hiring of female executives, 
Bell (2005) shows that newly hired female executives tend to have higher starting salaries in 
firms where the CEO is a woman, and Tate and Yang (2012) find that newly hired workers have 
a lower gender gap in starting salaries.  These multi-industry studies suggest that women help 
other women obtain larger portions of the firm’s economic pie. 
Law firms are likely to be fertile ground for bargaining.  Like many professions, a 
substantial portion of an attorney’s take-home pay is allocated in the form of salary.  However, 
firms also award discretionary bonuses to partners and associates based on perceived 
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performance (Gilson & Mnookin, 1985).  To the extent that obtaining these discretionary 
rewards requires an individual to have an advocate in the upper levels of a firm, highly paid 
women may help their female colleagues at all levels of the organization capture more value.  As 
a result, when a highly paid woman departs the firm, other women in the firm may lose an 
advocate, and their decrease in bargaining power may result in a decrease in earnings. 
To summarize the logic behind the first prediction, the exit of a highly paid woman from 
a law firm may hamper her female colleagues’ ability to create and capture value, which will 
result in a decline in their earnings upon her departure. 
Hypothesis 1:  A woman’s earnings will decrease following the exit of a highly paid 
female from the organization. 
Why Exit of a Highly Paid Female May Increase the Earnings of Women Who Remain 
with the Firm 
 
The previous section articulates why we would expect the earnings of women to decline 
following the departure of a highly paid female from the organization.  This section assembles 
theory predicting exactly the opposite effect – the exit of a woman from the organization may 
increase the earnings of her female colleagues who remain with the firm.  While the argument in 
the prior section relied on value creation and value capture arguments, this section mainly 
focuses on how the departure of one woman can shift value to the female attorneys who remain 
with the firm.  The theory in this section can be broken down into efficiency and institution-
oriented mechanisms.  
 The efficiency argument relies on the stylized empirical fact documented in the previous 
section – women in the upper levels of organizations are more likely to have female mentees 
than male mentees (O’Neill & Blake-Beard, 2002).  While the previous section argues that the 
departure of such a mentor may harm the productivity of mentees, it may also create an 
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opportunity for them to fill the void left by her departure.  Mentors share skills and social 
relationships with mentees.  For example, a female law partner may be more likely to invest in 
associates and junior partners who are female, involving them in her client relationships and 
providing them with tacit knowledge about the workings of the firm (Kay & Wallace, 2009).  
Since they have imbibed their mentor’s advice, skills, and social relationships, they may be well-
placed to benefit from her departure by taking a more prominent role with her clients15 and 
assuming her other duties with the organization.  As a result of this skill transfer, the departure of 
a highly paid woman may result in an increase in the earnings of the female attorneys who 
remain with the firm. 
The institutional argument arises from the idea that the firm may need to maintain gender 
diversity among its upper level members to preserve legitimacy with constituencies outside the 
organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), such as clients and potential 
employees.  With regard to clients, Beckman and Phillips (2005) document how large law firms 
increase the number of females in their partnership ranks after their corporate clients increase the 
number of women in the ranks of their upper level management.  This suggests that client 
preferences for female legal service providers may drive law firms to increase the representation 
of women in the upper levels of the firm.  As a result, when a highly paid woman exits the firm, 
the bargaining power of the remaining women may increase because they become more valuable 
in client service and acquisition.  This increase in bargaining power may manifest in higher 
earnings.    
                                                 
15 Attorneys are likely to port client relationships across organizations (Baker, Faulkner & Fischer, 1998), making it 
difficult for a firm to capture value from a client relationship when the relationship’s broker has moved to a different 
firm.  In the current paper, we examine individual exit via unexpected death, which will heighten the opportunity for 
other individuals in the firm to capture value from the departed person’s client relationships.  Even in the case of 
traditional mobility, however, individuals may still inherit client relationships to the extent that firms build redundant ties 
with multiple individuals and significant inter-firm routines make it difficult for a departing attorney to take 100% of a 
client’s business to another law firm. 
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The firm may also decide to promote a woman following a female departure in order to 
maintain legitimacy with other resource providers, such as prospective employees.  During the 
period covered by the data in this study (1990-2004), females constituted about 47% of law 
school enrollees (American Bar Association, 2011).    Female law students and potential lateral 
hires may be reluctant to join a firm that does not have a satisfactory number of highly paid 
women.   This may be due to homophily-based preferences (McPherson et al., 2001) for 
interacting with similar others (Byrne, 1961), or a lack of successful women in the firm may 
provide a signal to prospective female attorneys that they may have difficulty succeeding in the 
organization.  Prospective male employees may also prefer to work for gender diverse 
organizations.  The existence of influential organizations such as Building a Better Legal 
Profession, which provides firm diversity statistics, demonstrate the importance of these issues 
for attorneys in choosing their employers.   As a result, when a highly paid woman exits the firm, 
the bargaining power of the remaining women may increase because their presence may help the 
firm attract new talent.  This increase in bargaining power may manifest in higher earnings.    
Hypothesis 2:  A woman’s earnings will increase following the exit of a highly paid 
female from the organization. 
DATA 
US Census Legal Services Microdata 
Our data are drawn from a custom extract of the legal services industry from the US 
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) project.  These 
longitudinal data are remarkably rich.  They contain stable individual and firm identifiers as well 
as individual earnings and demographic information (including gender) for all employees in the 
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legal services industry in the 10 states we analyze16.  The years covered by the data range from 
1990-2004, depending on time the state entered the LEHD program (the earliest state entered in 
1990, the latest in 1994).  The longitudinal nature of the data enables us to track employees over 
time and across firms and to observe changes in compensation.   As a result, these data are 
uniquely suited to answer the research question posed in this paper.   
The data are constructed from state unemployment insurance records.  Each quarter, 
firms must submit Form ES-202, which lists the social security numbers (SSN) and total taxable 
earnings for each of the firm’s employees, which includes salary, bonuses, stock options, and 
other reported income, such partnership distributions that are crucial forms of payment in the 
legal services industry.  Combining these core data with Census and other governmental data, 
each observation in the dataset we analyze is an individual-year which contains the individual ID 
(anonymized from the SSN), the firm ID (anonymized from the Employer Identification Number 
used by the Internal Revenue Service), the year of observation, and the taxable earnings for that 
employee from that firm in that year, along with other individual-level demographic data17.  
Individual demographic data include age, gender, race, and date of death, the latter of which 
becomes important for the identification strategy described below.  While rich firm-level 
variables can be constructed based on aggregations of this individual-level information, the data 
contain few firm-level variables other than geographic location (i.e. Metropolitan Statistical Area 
codes as well as latitude and longitude).  For example, the data do not contain information on 
legal speciality. 
                                                 
16 These states include California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin.  These states were not chosen by the author; rather states must opt into the LEHD program, and these 
10 were the only ones participating when these data were extracted.   
17 The unit of analysis in the raw LEHD data is the “job-quarter” where a job is an employee-firm dyad.  To simplify this 
data structure to a number of observations that is analytically feasible (analyses must be conducted at Census Research 
Data Centers using available computing resources), we assign individuals to “dominant” firms based on the employer at 
which they have the highest earnings in a given year, and we collapse quarters into years by summing the earnings the 
employee draws from the dominant firm during the year. 
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While LEHD data are uniquely suited to answer the question posed in this paper, working 
with Census data have important limitations on that require acknowledgement before proceeding.  
The first is that all analyses are conducted at Census Research Data Centers using Census 
equipment and software.  The second is that the Center for Economic Studies at the Census 
Bureau submits all statistical output to a rigorous disclosure review process to ensure that no 
confidential information are revealed from the anonymized data.  Descriptive statistics and 
regression output (particularly those using dichotomous variables) must focus on a sufficiently 
large number of individuals and firms in order to meet disclosure requirements.  Due to the 
relatively small final sample used in this study and the large number of dichotomous variables 
used to measure various treatment states, we are unable to display detailed output for all analyses 
that we have conducted, but in all cases possible we have provide as much detail as possible 
given these constraints.   
Identification Strategy – Unexpected Deaths 
To ideally test the competing predictions above, a researcher randomly assign attorneys to 
organizations, choose some of those attorneys to exit their firms at random, and then observe the 
change in earnings among the individuals who remain with the organizations, focusing on gender 
as a key moderator.  We attempt to approach this experimental ideal by identifying unexpected 
deaths of highly paid attorneys in the LEHD data, matching the firms that experience these 
deaths to observably similar firms that do not, and then moving to the individual level to observe 
the change in earnings among the “treated” attorneys (those whose colleague passed away 
suddenly) as compared to their matched counterfactuals.   
Using unexpected death rather than simple exit or turnover has numerous important 
advantages.  Most crucially, an employee’s exit from a firm is a complex process that is likely to 
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be closely interrelated with the same process that determines subsequent earnings of his or her 
colleagues.  Therefore, it is difficult to make a causal claims about correlations between a highly 
paid attorney’s non-random exit from the firm and the subsequent earnings of his or her former 
colleagues.  It is not even clear ex ante which direction the bias would lie.  For example, highly 
paid attorneys may see that the firm is struggling and flee the sinking ship, creating a negative 
correlation between exit and colleague earnings that has little causal link to the exit itself.  
Conversely, exit can be indicative of good future prospects for former colleagues; competitors 
might be poaching highly paid attorneys because they want to recreate the current firm’s 
successful environment.  In this case, the bias would be positive. 
Unexpected deaths, on the other hand, have the advantage of quasi-randomness.  While it 
is possible that stress at one’s job may result in a heart attack, stroke or other form of sudden 
health problem, the process underlying an employee’s sudden death is much less likely than 
turnover to be correlated with the process determining his or her colleagues’ earnings.  Using 
unexpected death as a source of turnover enhances our confidence that some unobserved process 
is not affecting both exit and colleagues’ subsequent earnings and allows us to make a stronger 
claim about the causal link relating exit and colleague earnings. 
The relatively exogenous nature of sudden deaths and the researcher’s subsequently 
enhanced ability to make causal claims is the primary reason why prior scholars have used 
unexpected deaths in the empirical design of prior studies.  For example, Johnson et al. (1985) 
and Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2009) examine how the stock market and the 
firm’s performance (respectively) respond to the death of CEOs in order to determine the value 
of managers, Jones and Olken (2005) connect the death of national leaders to changes in GDP to 
determine the importance of national leadership for economic growth, Azoulay et al. (2010) and 
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Oetll (2012) examine how scientist death influences coauthor productivity to measure the 
importance of collaboration in scientific endeavor, and Aizenman and Kletzer (2011) examine 
how author death impacts forward citations to economics journal articles to shed light on why 
scholars cite each other’s work.18 
 It is important that the deaths we examine are unexpected, and not the result of a 
prolonged illness, because slow deaths blur the timing of the quasi-experimental treatment.  The 
prolonged hospitalization of a highly paid attorney may cause colleagues to change their 
behavior or exit the firm prior to time of death.  This effect will change the characteristics of the 
treated and control samples prior to the time of treatment, biasing our difference-in-difference 
estimates. 
Defining Unexpected Deaths 
While the LEHD data contain information on the exact day of death of each individual in 
the data if she dies during the sample period, I do not have access to information on the cause of 
death.  Individual identities in the data are anonymous and the Census Bureau does not permit 
linking individual-level data with outside sources, which precludes linkages obituaries, so I use 
the detailed information the LEHD provides on age and compensation to identify unexpected 
deaths.  Specifically, I count a death as unexpected when (a) the individual is under 60 years of 
age, and (b) the individual experiences positive seasonalized wage growth in the two quarters 
prior to the quarter of death19.  These criteria are reasonable given the significant jump in the 
mortality rate in the United States for individuals in their 60s (6.4 percent) relative to individuals 
                                                 
18 As with any empirical design, there is an important tradeoff in the choice to use sudden deaths as a 
source of exit.  In particular, it is important to think about whether the conclusions we draw from using sudden 
deaths as a source of exit will apply to more traditional inter-firm mobility.  We address this tension between 
internal and external validity in the discussion section. 
 
19 This means that wages in quarter Qi (where i=1,2,3,4) in year Yi are compared to wages in quarter Qi in year Yi-1, in 
order to account for fluctuations in wages owing to the yearly business cycle. 
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in their 50s (3.1 percent) and 40s (1.4 percent) (Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 
2009).  In addition, an attorney’s productivity would likely decline during a time of illness or 
hospitalization, making it difficult for him or her to earn UI-covered wages during that time 
period.  Only a small percentage of highly paid attorney deaths in the data (about 25 percent) 
meet these two criteria20. 
Defining the Unmatched Sample 
Because the LEHD data are so universal – indeed, every individual who has ever worked for an 
employer firm in the legal services industry in the included states in the covered time period is in 
the data21.  This means that the data contain all employees, including secretaries, paralegals, and 
other support personnel, in addition to partners, associates, and of counsel positions.  As a 
consequence, we must make decisions about which individuals and which firms to include in the 
sample that we will subsequently use to determine our treatment and control groups.  
We first drop all individual-years with earnings under $25,000 to eliminate individuals with 
weak attachment to employment in the legal services industry.   Because our theory focuses on 
attorneys, we want to ensure that the sample is composed primarily of attorneys.  The data do not 
contain information on individual’s formal position in the firm or their occupation, so we rely on 
detailed studies of the legal services industry and our rich earnings information identify 
attorneys.  Parkin and Baker (2006), analyzing a nationally representative sample of legal 
services firms, indicate that law firms, regardless of size, typically employ one non-attorney for 
every two attorneys (which can be either partners or associates).  This means that the lower one-
third of each firm’s pay distribution is likely composed of support personnel.  We thus drop all 
                                                 
20 Though not directly comparable, my set of criteria seem to be about as restrictive as Azoulay et al. (2010) who impose 
an age cutoff of 67 and find that about 45% of their deceased scientists pass away suddenly. 
21 “Employer firm” refers to organizations which pay into the state’s unemployment insurance program.  This includes 
all firms except sole proprietorships.  We would likely exclude sole proprietors from our analyses anyway, because these 
individuals by definition do not have colleagues whose earnings we can examine. 
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individual-years where the employee is in the bottom third of the firm’s earning’s distribution. 
Throughout the paper, we refer to individuals in the upper two-thirds of the firm’s earnings 
distribution as “attorneys.”   We finally drop all firm-years that do not have more than five 
attorneys.  Because we are interested in the earnings of colleagues following the death of a 
highly paid individual, we must eliminate firm-years where the number of colleagues is small or 
non-existent.  The results we present below are similar if we use a minimum of 10, 15, and 25 
attorneys. 
Determining the Treatment Sample 
From this trimmed sample, we first identify firm-year observations that experience the 
unexpected death of highly paid attorney22.  We define highly paid attorneys as those in the 
upper 50% of the firm’s distribution of attorney earnings (i.e. the employees that are left after 
trimming the bottom third of the earnings distribution in step two above).  We again rely on 
Parkin and Baker’s (2006) in-depth study of the legal services industry in making this choice – 
they indicate that law firms typically employ one associate per partner regardless of firm size, 
suggesting that the top 50% of the firm’s earners are likely partners in the firm.  We 
conservatively refrain from calling these individuals “partners”, instead using the term “highly 
paid attorneys”, because we cannot be certain about their membership in the partnership of the 
firm, but we are certain of their position in the firm’s earnings distribution.  The results to follow 
are robust to more restrictive definitions of “highly paid”, such as the top 33% and 25% of the 
firm’s attorney earnings distribution, but Census disclosure requirements dictate that we present 
                                                 
22 We exclude the small number of firm-years where more than one death occurs because it is not clear how to 
appropriately measure these events.  We use dummy variables to examine the effect of deaths over time, so using a 
continuous variable that “counts” the number of deaths in the firm is not feasible.  Treating multi-death events the 
same as single-death events is one possibility, but becomes a problem if partners of each gender pass away.  
Measuring multi-event deaths separately is also possible, but fortunately these situations are uncommon enough that 
there are not a sufficient number of observations to create a separate suite of dummy variables. 
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results based on the top 50% because the sample size becomes too small with the more restrictive 
definitions.   
  After identifying the approximately 250 firm years that experience the unexpected death 
of at least one highly paid attorney, we confront a common problem in event-type studies:  the 
treatment of “multiple” events – in this case, firms with multiple years where they experience the 
death of a highly paid attorney, or firm-years where more than one highly paid attorney dies 
unexpectedly.  Authors usually take one of two approaches – either they focus only on the first 
event or, more conservatively, they drop observations with multiple events (Campbell, 2013).  
We take the second approach in the analyses presented here, dropping the small number of firms 
that experience multiple instances of deaths of highly paid attorneys.  Results are the same under 
either approach due to the relatively rarity of multiple events. 
The Matching Procedure 
To construct our control sample, we match each of the 250 eligible firm-years that 
experience the death of a highly paid attorney to a “twin” firm-year that does not experience a 
death.  In order to preserve the exclusivity of the treatment and control samples in the panel data 
analysis, we require that control firms never experience the unexpected death of a partner 
attorney during the period covered by the data.   
We use Coarsened Exact Matching ([CEM] Iacus, King & Porro, 2012) to locate suitable 
“twin” firm-years that do not experience a death to serve as control observations.  CEM ensures 
that treatment and control observations are similar on a set of observable characteristics selected 
by the analyst prior to performing regression analysis or mean comparisons.  The analyst selects 
the variables on which she would like the treatment and control observations to be similar, then 
“coarsens” the variables by breaking them into discrete chunks (e.g. instead of matching the 
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exact number of lawyers in a firm, we break this variable into the size categories recognized by 
the National Association of Legal Professionals).  Each observation is then assigned to a stratum 
based on the coarsened values of all covariates.  Strata that contain at least one treated and 
control observation are retained, while strata without a suitable “twin” are discarded.   The 
method is thus similar to propensity score matching, but with the added benefit that we do not 
have to endure the painful process of ensuring balance in the covariates – balance in all selected 
covariates is guaranteed by the fact that the treated and control observations lie in the same 
stratum.  While this method was developed by political scientists, it has been adopted by a broad 
variety of social science researchers.  For examples closest to the current analysis, note that 
Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oettl (2012) each use CEM to construct control samples in their 
examinations of how scientist death affects the publishing rates of surviving colleagues. 
Our goal in matching firms is to find a counterfactual organization that is observationally 
equivalent to the firm that experiences the death of a highly paid attorney.  We select four 
important observable characteristics at the firm-year level to serve as our matching criteria – 
location, size, performance, and female representation in the upper part of the firm’s earnings 
distribution (See Table 8).  Specifically, we first require that firms be located in the same 
Metropolitan Statistical Area and state, since some MSAs cross state lines but competition 
between law firms is often conducted on a state-by-state basis given the high costs of passing the 
bar in multiple states.  We next match the number of attorneys in the firm-year (size), the firm-
year’s compensation per attorney (performance) 23, and the percentage of highly paid (top 50% 
of attorney earnings distribution) attorneys in the firm who are female (representation of 
women).  The latter criteria is especially important – gender diversity is not randomly distributed 
                                                 
23  Law firms return most of their revenue to partners as income and law firms have few costs beyond human capital, 
so compensation closely tracks revenues and revenues closely track profits; revenue is also the key performance 
metric used in industry publications evaluating law firms (e.g. AmLaw Top 100). 
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among organizations, and we want to guard against the possibility that firms which experience 
the death of a highly paid female may differ systematically from firms that experience the death 
of a highly paid male.  We return to this issue many times below. 
We match on our criteria in both the year prior to treatment and the two years prior to 
treatment in order to ensure that the trend between the treatment and control samples is similar, 
since differences in pre-treatment trends would render our fixed effect estimates inconsistent.  To 
further ensure a match on the trend, we create a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm 
increased its number of attorneys between t-2 and t-1 and also match firms based on this 
criterion.  Table 8 displays the exact “cut points” for each of the coarsened variables. 
Table 9 displays the outcome of the matching procedure.  We first note that of the 250 
treated firm-years, a suitable match was obtained for 62 of them for a match rate of about 25%.   
While each treated firm-year was assigned to a unique stratum, after the initial match, 15 strata 
contained multiple control firm-years.  In these cases, the best control firm-year was identified as 
the one whose size was the closest to the treated firm-year.   T-tests demonstrate good balance on 
each of the selected covariates at times t-1 and t-2.  At time t-1, the average treated firm has 49 
attorneys and $100,000 in compensation per attorney, and 21% highly paid individuals in the 
firm are women.  These values compare favorably to the mean values in the overall trimmed 
sample from which these matched firm-years are drawn, increasing our confidence that despite 
the relatively low match rate (25%), our matched sample is representative of the larger sample. 
Comparing Treatment Samples by Gender of Deceased Attorney 
Of the 62 treated firms, ten experience the death of female partners.  While this is a 
relatively small number of observations, many studies utilizing a difference-in-difference 
framework rely on a single shock to obtain treatment and control samples.   The smaller number 
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of deaths of highly paid females as compared to highly paid males reflects not only the under-
representation of women in the upper echelons of law firms (about 20% of partners are women 
according to National Association of Legal Professionals surveys during the sample period; the 
same number holds in our sample [see Table 8] when we use position in the firm’s pay 
distribution as a proxy for partnership), but also the fact that women tend to have lower mortality 
rates than men (Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009). 
As mentioned above, an important concern is that that firms that experience the death of a 
female partner might differ systematically from firms that experience the death of a male partner.  
While the ideal approach would be to match triads of firms – i.e. one with a female partner death, 
one with a male partner death, and one with no death – the small size of the sample and the 
relative infrequence of unexpected deaths makes this approach infeasible.  Thus, to assuage these 
concerns, we follow Oettl (2012) and also compare the balance in covariates across the sample of 
firm-years that experience the death of a female partner and the sample of firm-years that 
experience the death of a male partner.  The small size of the samples precludes us from 
displaying average values of covariates, but t-tests indicate that these firms are statistically 
indistinguishable on each selected covariate, save for one – the percentage of highly paid 
individuals who are female.  This difference is not surprising since firms with more highly paid 
females are more likely to be the locus of highly paid female deaths.   
While the similarity on the other dimensions suggests that these firms are comparable, a 
higher percentage of highly paid female means that firms that experience highly paid female 
deaths may be systematically different as compared to firms that experience highly paid male 
deaths, particularly with regard to gender equality.  We address this issue in two ways.  First, our 
forthcoming regressions contain a number of control variables to help parametrically account for 
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potential differences in gender climate.  In addition, in robustness tests, we split the sample based 
on the gender of the deceased individual, so that we can be certain that our 10 firms experiencing 
the death of woman are compared only to their 10 matched counterfactuals.   
Characteristics of the Final Sample 
Following the match, we identify all attorneys working for the treated and control firm-
years, and we obtain their entire career histories preceding and following the year of treatment, 
including years in which they worked for other organizations in the legal services industry.  Our 
primary analyses examine how the earnings of the treatment group differ from those of the 
control group, allowing the gender of the focal individual and the gender of the deceased partner 
to moderate these differences. 
Consequently, while we matched at the firm-year level, we use the individual-year level 
of analysis in our regressions.  We could conduct our analysis at the firm level and perhaps use 
the average disparity in wages of men and women in the firm as the dependent variable, and 
examine how this disparity changes following the death of attorneys of different genders.  We 
choose the individual level approach, examining how individual earnings changes following 
attorney death, for two key reasons.  First, it allows us to account for selection bias by tracking 
individuals across firms.  A firm’s gender disparity may change over time following a death due 
to mobility in and out of the organization, and we want to rule out this possibility. Second, 
conducting our analysis at the individual level allows us to account for unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity in individual attorney quality (driven by factors such as law school 
affiliation) via individual-level fixed effects.  We do not have detailed data on these time-
invariant individual level characteristics that might be important ingredients in determining 
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attorney earnings, so utilizing individual fixed effects in our regressions is important, and would 
be impossible at the firm level of analysis. 
Table 10 provides means and standard deviations for key variables for the full matched 
sample at the individual level of analysis.  We see that the average attorney has earnings of about 
$102,000 per year, is 43 years old, and has 3.6 years of left-censored tenure.  50% of the 
individuals in the sample are female, which is slightly higher than the industry average of about 
45% reported by the National Association of Legal Professionals (NALP 2011) during the study 
period.  We also see that the individual-year observations are split evenly between the treatment 
and control groups, which provides some comfort that individuals who experience a death are 
not necessarily more or less likely to remain within the legal services industry (recall that when 
individuals leave the industry, they also exit the data).   
We also see that individuals experiencing a death are split about evenly between male 
(13% of all observations) and female (12% of all observations) observations, but that most of the 
treatment sample is exposed to the death of a highly paid male (23% of all observations) rather 
than a highly paid female (2% of all observations).  This disparity reflects the greater number of 
men in the upper part of law firm earnings distributions, not only in our sample but in the 
industry more generally (both in the sample [see Table 8] and in national surveys compiled by 
NALP, only about 20% of partners are female), as well as the higher risk of death for men as 
compared to women. 
Table 10 also includes information for firm-level “gender climate” variables that we use 
to account for differences in firms that experience the death of highly paid females as opposed to 
highly paid males.  These variables include the percentage of the firm’s attorneys that are female, 
the percentage of the firm’s partners (those in the upper half of the attorney pay distribution) that 
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are female, and the ratio of average female earnings in the firm to average male earnings.  Each 
of these variables is included in the regressions that follow. 
Regression Estimation 
The first empirical model we estimate is  
(1) Log(Yit) = β1Deathit + β2Controlsit + β2Controlsjt + φit + μit + γi + δt +  εit 
Where Yit is the taxable earnings of individual  i in year t, Deathit is an indicator variable that 
switches to one in the period that individual i’s highly paid colleague dies and remains at one in 
all periods thereafter, Controlsit are the vector of individual-level control variables listed in Table 
10, Controlsjt is the vector of firm-level control variables listed in Table 10, φit is a vector of 
more than 20 individual age dummies (one for every two years, e.g. 25-26, 27-28, and so on),  μit 
is a vector of thirteen tenure dummies (one for every possible years of left-censored tenure in the 
fourteen years of data in the sample), γi are a vector of individual fixed effects, δt is a set of year 
dummies, and εit is a vector of Huber-White robust standard errors.  These standard errors are 
adjusted for 124 clusters corresponding to each of the 62 control and 62 treatment firm-years that 
were the basis of the sample.  This clustering helps account for dependence over time in the 
observations of individuals who experience the death of the same colleague, even if these 
individuals depart for other organizations in the legal services industry.  Results are qualitatively 
similar for other cluster choices, including 6368 clusters (one for each individual i), and 62 
clusters (one for each death in the sample; in this case treatment and control observations are 
assigned to the same cluster). 
 β1 provides the estimate of the treatment effect, the effect on individual i’s earnings 
following the death of a highly paid colleague relative to the earnings of the counterfactual 
individual-years that have not experienced a death.  Table 11 provides the estimate of this effect.  
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Since the dependent variable in Equation 1 is a logarithm and Deathit  is a dummy, the coefficient 
indicates that the average individual experiences an increase in wages of about 3% following the 
unexpected  death of a highly paid colleague.   
 Figure 3 shows how the treatment effect varies over time. The graph displays the value of 
coefficients for a regression including each of the variables and fixed effects of Equation 1, but 
Deathit has been replaced by interactions between 1) a set of dummies corresponding to the years 
before and after a highly paid attorney’s death and 2) a dummy variable indicating whether 
individual i is a member of the treatment or control group.  Figure 3 allows us to further evaluate 
the quality of the matched sample and the causal effect of colleague death.  Since the earnings of 
the treatment group are indistinguishable from those of the control group until a death occurs (at 
which time they experience a relatively monotonic increase) this gives us some confidence that 
the timing of these deaths are relatively unexpected and that the earnings of treatment and 
control samples were not already diverging prior to treatment. 
Though these first results do not yet shed light on the gender-related questions of the 
paper, they are themselves interesting.  While Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oettl (2012) find that the 
death of star scientists reduces the productivity of their coauthors in terms of quality-weighted 
publications, we find that in legal services, individual earnings increase following the death of a 
highly paid colleague.  This is almost certainly due to important differences in the two settings.   
As we discussed in the theory section, it is possible to see why coworkers’ earnings might 
increase because of the unexpected death of a colleague in legal services.  Not only might 
partners inherit more business from the clients of the deceased individual, but deaths create 
openings in vacancy chains.  The death of a highly paid person might make way for the ascent of 
surviving individuals through the hierarchy of the firm.  Neither of these possibilities exist to the 
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same degree in academic science, which is also a setting noted for the importance of 
collaboration and team production.  In that setting, the loss of a colleague is much more likely to 
be harmful to one’s career prospects.  The fact that attorneys seem to benefit, on average, from 
the unexpected deaths of colleagues underscores the “dog-eat-dog” world that scholars have 
noted in prior studies of legal services (e.g. Hagan & Kay, 2007). 
The shape of the increase in earnings displayed by Figure 3 also deserves mention.  The 
fact that the individual increase in earnings persists and increases over time suggests that those 
who experience the death of a highly paid colleague are provided an advantage that continues 
over the course of their career, whether it is a particularly valuable client relationship that leads 
to other similar ties, or a promotion that sets an individual’s career on a faster and more 
profitable track than would have otherwise materialized had their highly paid colleague not 
passed away suddenly. 
The more interesting question, and the question at the heart of this paper, is whether this 
average increase in earnings masks underlying heterogeneity based on the gender of the highly 
paid attorney who dies and his or her colleagues who continue working in the industry.  Do these 
deaths shift compensation away from men and towards women, or vice versa?  Or is there no 
substantial difference?   
Estimating Equation 2 allows us to shed light on this question.   
(2)  Log(Yit) = β1FemaleLivingFemaleDeathit + β2MaleLivingFemaleDeathit + 
β3FemaleLivingMaleDeathit + β4MaleLivingMaleDeathit + β5Controlsit + β6Controlsjt + 
φit + μit + γi + δt +  εit 
 
Equation 2 is exactly the same as Equation 1 in most respects – it contains the same control 
variables and fixed effects.  The difference is that the Deathit treatment effect from Equation 1 is 
divided into four separate groups represented by four different dichotomous variables, based on 
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the gender of the highly paid colleague that passed away and the gender of individual i.  The 
omitted group in this set up is the set of individual-years that have not experienced a death.  We 
will compare outcomes based on gender by comparing the statistical differences among β1 
through β4. 
Table 11 shows the results for Equation 2, and Figure 4 displays the coefficients and 90% 
confidence intervals for β1 through β4.  These are the focal results of the paper.  We see that 
women who experience the death of a female colleague experience the greatest increase in 
earnings among the four possible gender combinations – an 8% increase.  The 90% confidence 
interval for β1 does not overlap with those of the other coefficients; this indicates that it is 
significantly different from the others at a 5% level.  Note that each of the other coefficients have 
overlapping confidence intervals, suggesting that they are statistically equivalent.  These results 
provide confirmation of Hypothesis 2 as opposed to Hypothesis 1 – it appears that the death of a 
highly paid woman increases the earnings of her female colleagues who remain in the legal 
services industry.  Moreover, this increase is greater than the increase women experience from 
the death of a highly paid male colleague, and is higher than increases seen by men when a 
highly paid colleague of either gender passes away.   
Exploring Mechanisms behind the Focal Result 
In the theory leading up to Hypothesis 2, we provided two potential reasons why the exit 
of a highly paid woman might increase the earnings of her female colleagues.  The first was that 
mentoring relationships might naturally create a transfer of skills between females in the firm, 
allowing women to inherit clients and new responsibilities in the organization upon the departure 
of a female colleague.  The other explanation is a bargaining power-centric, institutional 
argument related to the firm’s need to retain and promote females in order to maintain legitimacy 
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in the market for clients and potential employees. While it is difficult to differentiate between 
these explanations without detailed, multi-firm data on mentoring relationships, we explore 
moderation effects with our available variables in an effort to pin down the mechanism.  
We use two variables to capture a woman’s potential bargaining power – the surviving 
person’s raw position in the firm’s earnings distribution, and the percentage of the firm’s highly 
paid attorneys that are female at the time the death occurs.  If bargaining power is the primary 
mechanism, we should see that women in the apex of the firm’s earnings distribution experience 
greater earnings increases following female death, and we should also see weaker increase when 
the firm has more women in highly paid positions.   
We also identify two variables that should capture the effect of mentoring  - the distance 
between the deceased and surviving individual in terms of position in the firm’s earnings 
distribution and distance between the deceased and surviving individual in terms of age.  Women 
that are younger or beneath the deceased person in the firm’s earnings should be more likely to 
be mentees of the deceased person, and stronger effects for these individuals provide support for 
the mentoring argument.   
 First we examine the bargaining power variables.  Table 12 interacts the dummies in 
Equation 2 with each individual’s within-firm attorney earnings percentile (following trimming 
for lower paid support staff) at the time of the death.  If lower paid attorneys are more likely to 
benefit following female partner death, this helps rule out the institutional argument since lower 
paid women would not be externally visible members of the firm and would also not be in as 
strong a position to benefit from gender homophily in client relationships.   Note that this 
variable does not change over time within each individual, so its direct effect is absorbed by the 
individual fixed effect.  Inspecting the interaction terms, we see that the increase in earnings for 
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women following female partner death is increasing with the surviving attorney’s earnings 
percentile at the time of the death.  This suggests that among surviving women in the firm, other 
highly paid females are more likely to benefit from a colleague’s unexpected death.  Figure 5 
provides the graph of this effect.  Inspecting confidence intervals, we see that the effect is only 
significant for women who are in the top 50% of the firm’s pay distribution when their female 
colleague passes away.  In most law firms (Parkin & Baker, 2006), these individuals will likely 
be partners in the organization. 
Table 14 replaces the earnings percentile variable with a variable measuring the 
percentage of the firm’s partners that are female at the time of the death.   This variable arguably 
also helps capture bargaining power – if women’s earnings increase more substantially when 
there are fewer highly paid females in the firm, then remaining females might be exploiting the 
scarcity of their group and the importance of their presence to external audiences to extract more 
value from the firm.  We see that the increase in earnings for women following female partner 
death is statistically unaffected by the percentage of female partners in the firm at the time of the 
death.  We also experimented with other measures, such as the raw number of women in the 
upper echelons of the firm and using different earnings percentile cutoffs to measure partner 
attorneys, and results remained the same. Note again that the direct effect of this variable does 
not vary within individual, so it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect. 
 Next we move to the interactions that help test the mentoring mechanism.   We first use 
the difference in the age of the surviving and deceased individuals at the time of the death as the 
moderating variable.  The variable is measured as (age of surviving individual at time of 
colleague’s death - age of deceased person at time of death).   If we find that this variable 
positively moderates the effects in Equation 2, then this weakens support for the mentoring 
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argument because women who are older than the deceased woman are less likely to be her 
mentees.  Analyses for this interaction have been conducted but not yet submitted for Census 
Bureau review and disclosure.  In unreported analyses, we indeed see this positive moderation, 
which suggests that women who are older than the deceased woman are more likely to see 
earnings increases upon her death.  Note once again that the direct effect of this variable does not 
vary within individual, so it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect24. 
 To further test the mentoring argument, we use the difference in the within-firm earnings 
percentile of the surviving and deceased individuals at the time of the death as the next 
moderating variable.  Analyses for this interaction have been conducted but not yet submitted for 
Census Bureau review and disclosure.  The variable is measured as (earnings percentile of 
surviving individual at time of colleague’s death - earnings percentile of deceased person at time 
of death).   If we find that this variable positively moderates the effects in Equation 2, then this 
weakens support for the mentoring argument because women who are higher in the firm’s 
earnings distribtuon than the deceased woman are less likely to be her mentees.  In undisclosed 
analyses, we indeed see this positive moderation (significant at the 5% level), which suggests 
that women who are higher in the firm’s pay distributon than the deceased woman are more 
likely to see pay increases upon her death.  Note once again that the direct effect of this variable 
does not vary within individual, so it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect. 
Putting these results together, we see that three of the four interaction terms seem to 
support the institutional argument instead of the mentoring argument.  The fourth interaction is 
inconclusive.  Women who are older or better compensated than their deceased colleague or sit 
higher in the firm’s raw earnings distribution are more likely to see larger pay increases upon her 
                                                 
24 We have conducted analyses using the raw age of the woman when her colleague passes away.  We also find positive 
moderation here, suggesting that older women experience a stronger earnings increase when a highly paid female passes 
away.  Table 8 displays the results of these analyses. 
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death.  We likely obtain these results either because these women are well positioned to inherit a 
female colleague’s clients due to gender homophily in service relationships (Beckman & 
Phillips, 2005), or because a sudden relative scarcity of women and an institutional preference 
for diversity provide them with increased bargaining power.  
Robustness tests 
When estimating Equation 1, the counterfactual observations include all individuals who do not 
experience a death during their time in the data (the full control group), as well as individual-
years for attorneys who will experience a death in later periods.  These counterfactual 
observations are entirely appropriate when examining Equation 1.   
Equation 2 is a slightly different.  Here, we are comparing each of the four gender-based 
dummy variables to the same counterfactual observations as Equation 1.  However, we noted in 
the description of the matching results that firms experiencing a female death (and their control 
observations) have significantly more women than firms that experience a male death (and their 
control observations).  Thus, lumping individuals that experience female deaths (and their 
matched controls) into the same sample as individuals that experience male deaths (and their 
matched controls) may not be appropriate in terms of pinning down the correct counterfactual 
observations. 
To address, we split the sample into 1) the treated and matched individuals who 
experience female death (the “female death sample”) and 2) the treated and matched individuals 
who experience male death (the “male death sample”).  We find results that are consistent with 
those presented above – women benefit most colleague death in the female death sample, while 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine whether female attorney earnings increase or decrease following the 
exit of a highly paid woman from the organization.  We provide deductive theoretical arguments 
as to why one might plausibly expect either an increase or decrease in women’s earnings 
following the departure of a highly paid female colleague.  Using unexpected deaths as a quasi-
experimental stand-in for departure from the firm, we find that female attorneys’ earnings 
increase about 8% following the death of a highly paid female colleague.  This increase is 
statistically higher than the increase that women experience when a male colleague dies 
unexpectedly, and is also statistically higher than the earnings change that men experience when 
a colleague of either gender dies unexpectedly.   
Utilizing a variety of interactions in an effort to explain the mechanism behind this result, 
we find the effect is stronger when the surviving female attorney is older and more highly paid 
than her deceased colleague, while the density of highly paid women in the organization does not 
appear to have an effect.  This pattern suggests that the firm’s more powerful women benefit 
most when one of their highly paid female colleagues passes away.  The increase likely stems 
from gender homophily in client relationships (where women are more likely to inherit the 
deceased woman’s clients) or “window dressing” in which the firm shares more rents with 
surviving women since their presence in the firm is suddenly more important to the firm’s ability 
to retain legitimacy with clients and other stakeholders.  
 This study has a number of limitations that caution against over-generalizing its findings 
but also open up exciting opportunities for future work.  The first is whether the conclusions we 
draw from deaths can apply to more general kinds of turnover, such as dismissal or voluntary 
mobility to a different firm.  The most important difference between death and mobility is that in 
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the case of death, the client relationships held by the focal individual are suddenly “up for grabs” 
whereas a living person who changes firms is likely to port these relationships to their next job 
(Baker et al., 1998).  Consequently, the magnitude of the pay increases seen in this study might 
be smaller if we were to conduct an ideal experiment with “random” mobility instead of the 
second-best solution of unexpected death.   
 The second boundary condition of this study is related to the context.  Legal services is 
an idiosyncratic industry where institutional processes and client relationships play a pivotal role 
(Lagella, 2001), perhaps more so than in other industries.  The results here likely apply rather 
directly to other professional services contexts such as architecture, accounting, and consulting, 
which are a large and growing portion of the United States economy.  However, in other 
industries where work is more collaborative and client relationships are less appropriable by 
single individuals, we might expect earnings to decline following the death of a highly paid 
colleague, similar to the results seen by Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oetll (2012) in their study of 
productivity of academic scientists following the death of a prominent coauthor.  With regard to 
gender effects, in industries where the pressure for external legitimacy is lower, we might expect 
to see women’s earnings decline following the death of a highly paid female colleague because 
internal advocacy and bargaining might take precedence over external legitimacy concerns in 
those industries.  In addition, legal services is an industry which is statutorily required to 
organize in partnerships, meaning that the firm’s managers are also its residual claimants.  
Industries that are organized in corporate forms where pay may be set by an independent board 
of directors are likely to have much different pay bargaining processes and thus might display 
different results.  However, it is important to note that the underrepresentation of women in 
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corporate board rooms parallels that in law firm partnerships, suggesting that some of the basic 
mechanisms at play in this study may apply to corporate settings (Matsa & Miller, 2012). 
 The third limitation relates to the empirical design.  The ideal design would allow us to 
match triads of firms – those that experience the death of a female, those that experience the 
death of a male, and those that experience no death – and compare outcomes across the three 
types.  Due to lack of data, we were unable to locate sufficient matches to conduct this type of 
analysis.  While we have done our best to parametrically account for differences across firms that 
might explain gender sorting and gender differences in pay, such as the percentage of women in 
the firm, the percentage of women in the apex of the firm’s pay distribution, and the ratio of 
men’s and women’s earnings, the possibility exists that this matching process might be affecting 
our results.  For example, it might be possible that firms that are more likely to experience a 
female death employ more women and thus have a more “female friendly” environment that puts 
women on a strong earnings trajectory. 
 It would also be interesting to see whether the results we see in this paper for gender also 
apply to other individual characteristics such as race, national origin, or sexual orientation.  The 
data used in this provide information on race, but the small number of highly paid, non-white 
members of legal services firms made for insurmountable Census disclosure constraints. 
Despite these limitations, this paper makes a number of contributions at the intersection 
of literatures examining gender inequality, careers, and inter-firm mobility.  We provide 
evidence which suggests that firms may use gender diversity as “window dressing” to maintain 
legitimacy with external audiences such as clients and potential employees.  This external 
pressure gives a paradoxic bargaining power to highly placed members of groups that are 
traditionally thought to be disadvantaged, such as women in law firms in the current study.  
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While most studies of bargaining power and individual rent appropriation focus on the 
uniqueness of an individual’s skills and abilities (Coff, 1999) or position in a social network 
(Burt, 1992), the results in this paper suggest that demographic characteristics can also be a 
source of bargaining power as well – especially when outside audiences may judge firms based 
on the appearance of their upper level members.  The results also have interesting implications 
for studies of vacancy chains (Chase, 1991).  Prior studies of movement through vacancy chains 
have focused on the functional skills of employees who move into jobs that are left open by the 
departure of others.  We add the insight that, similar to the Westphal and Zajac’s (1996) 
examination of the differences between CEOs and their successors, demographic characteristics 






TURNOVER, MANAGERIAL TENURE, 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE:  EVIDENCE FROM 
INJURIES IN THE NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
 
How does turnover, the exit of employees from the organization, affect firm 
performance?  A long line of scholars have given careful thought to this question.  While some 
scholars suggest that low levels of turnover can refresh the organization  (Glebbeek and Bax, 
2004; Siebert & Zubanov, 2009; Staw, 1980), most empirical work finds a negative relationship 
between the exit of employees and unit-level performance (Shaw, Gupta & Delery, 2005; Shaw 
et al., 2005;  Kacmar et al., 2006; Stuart, 2012).  One of the important theoretical rationales 
behind these results is that departure of employees disrupts routines and makes it harder for those 
who remain with the organization to do their jobs effectively (Ton & Huckman, 2008).   
To this point, most work has focused on studying and quantifying the disruptive effects 
of turnover.  In this paper, I extend this line of inquiry by examining organizational factors that 
may weaken or exacerbate the disruptive effects of employee exit.  I focus in particular on the 
manager who remains with the firm after an important subordinate departs.  The exit of a key 
81 
 
employee puts the onus on the organization’s manager to craft a response that minimizes 
disruption and allows the organization to continue effective operations (March & Simon, 1958).  
Surprisingly, prior work abstracts away from the interaction between management and turnover.    
I draw on theories of organizational routines in the tradition of Nelson & Winter (1982) 
to determine whether managers with longer organizational tenure attenuate or exacerbate the 
negative effect of lower level employee exit on organizational performance.  On the one hand, 
managers with longer tenure may have superior knowledge of their firm’s routines and 
remaining stock of human resources, allowing them to respond effectively to key employee 
departure.  On the other hand, organizations where the manager has longer tenure may be 
unaccustomed to dealing with change, and well-established routines may fail after the shock of 
employee departure.  At a broader level, this theory presents a multi-level view of the 
relationship between organizational stability and change, with tenure and turnover as key proxies 
for each of these processes.  Effectively, I examine whether constancy at the managerial level of 
the organization may help an organization overcome departures and turbulence at the employee 
levels. 
I implement a robust empirical design to differentiate between these two arguments.  The 
endogenous connection between employee departure and organizational performance makes 
causal inference a unique challenge for empirical researchers.  I overcome this issue by studying 
the performance of National Football League teams during the 2011 and 2012 regular seasons, 
using injuries to the team’s most important player, the quarterback, as a quasi-random (Stuart, 
2012) source of employee exit.  I cast the head coach of each NFL team as the organization’s top 
manager.  In addition to the quasi-random nature of injuries, the depth of historical performance 
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and career data available in this context allows me to include variables that are typically omitted 
in organizational performance regressions in other settings. 
My results support the second of the two competing hypotheses – teams with longer 
tenured coaches perform worse following quarterback injury.  This result does not appear to be 
driven by the coach’s observable quality, nor the overlap in tenure between the coach and 
quarterback.  After considering multiple inferences related to this result, my favored 
interpretation underscores the complex relationship between micro-level organizational stability 
and change at multiple levels of the organization.   When a manager has longer tenure, the 
organization’s routines are likely to be relatively unchanged over time.  Consequently, when an 
employee departs, the routines may be inflexible and fracture under the strain of the shift.   I 
discuss the implications of this idea for the study of turnover, organizational routines, and human 
resource management in the discussion section.   
Key Employee Turnover and Organizational Performance 
Scholars have long demonstrated an interest in the causal effect of employee departure, or 
turnover, on organizational performance.  Turnover captures scholars’ attention because of the 
costs that it imposes on the organization (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011), particularly in the short 
term.  Employees disrupt the firm’s stock of human and social capital upon their departure (Dess 
& Shaw, 2001), necessitating hiring and training of new employees (Kacmar et al., 2006), 
recalibrating the organization’s routines to conform to the new employee group (Ton & 
Huckman, 2008), and managing the emotions of the remaining employees to ensure that their 
colleague’s choice does not permeate to others in the organization (Felps et al., 2009).   
Some scholars note that turnover can have positive consequences in the form of 
refreshing the organization (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984; Staw, 1980) and spreading its social 
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connections to other firms (Somaya, Williamson & Lorinkova, 2008).  However, most studies 
examining the correlation between turnover and unit-level performance find a negative 
relationship (Batt, 2002; Glebbeek & Bax, 2006; Shaw, Gupta & Delery, 2005; Shaw et al., 
2005;  Kacmar et al., 2006), particularly when the exiting employees are important workers 
(Aime et al., 2010), such as those that are central in an organization’s cooperative network 
(Stuart, 2012).   
As March and Simon (1958) note, employee exit is a given part of organizational life.  
However, while the negative effect of key employee turnover is starting to gain empirical 
credence, few studies have addressed the organizational factors that can attenuate or exacerbate 
its disruption.  Ton & Huckman (2008) suggest that robust organizational routines can allow 
employees to move through the organization without it experiencing a notable drop in 
productivity; however, these strong routines can limit employee creativity in the long run.  
Arthur (1994) provides some evidence that organizations with stronger human resource practices 
experience a lower correlation between turnover and organizational performance.   
Hauskenecht and Holwerda (2012), in their theoretical reframing of the unit-level 
turnover-performance relationship, suggest that researchers would profit from focusing on the 
individuals that remain with the firm after leavers depart.   Indeed, turnover’s negative causal 
effects occur after the departed employee has gone, meaning that how the remaining members of 
the organization respond to the departure will determine its ultimate effect on organizational 
performance.  While Hauskenecht & Holwerda’s (2012) theoretical discussion mainly takes 
place within one level of the organization (e.g. the competencies of employees at the same 
hierarchical rung as the departing employee), looking across levels to the employee’s superiors 
may help us understand how organizations can better manage the departure of important 
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employees.   Inspired by Barnard’s observation that one of the key executive functions is to 
“replace the losses that continually take place by reason of death, resignation, ‘backsliding,’ 
emigration, discharge, excommunication, ostracism.” (Barnard, 1968: 227), in this paper we 
focus on the role of the firm’s manager in buffering the firm from the negative effects of 
employee exit.   
My theoretical conceptualization of an organization’s manager focuses on the individual 
who has direct responsibility for the performance of the collective that an exiting employee 
departs (Hauskenecht & Trevor, 2011).  For example, in the case of law firms, when the 
employee is a senior associate, the manager would be the partner in charge of the associate’s 
office.  In the case of manufacturing plants, when the employee is a production engineer, the 
manager would be the plant-level executive in charge of the plant’s operations.  In the case of 
sports teams, if the employee is an athlete or player, the top manager would be the head coach. 
Managerial Tenure, Key Employee Turnover, and Organizational Performance 
Nelson and Winter (1982) provide the important insight that routines are the genes of 
nearly all enduring organizations.  Organizations are valued because of their ability to 
consistently reproduce products and services (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and routines provide 
the grist for this consistency by implicitly or explicitly defining how employees conduct day-to-
day tasks. 
 The exit of an important employee from the organization is likely to disrupt the firm’s 
routines, particularly in the short run (Ton & Huckman, 2008).  Depending on the employee’s 
role, a replacement may need to hastily be put into place, or other employees must divide the 
departed person’s work among themselves.  In either case, the individual’s departure creates a 
ripple effect through the routines of the organization – adjustments to the routines in which the 
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departed individual participated will spill over into other routines of the organization as 
employees reallocate time and resources to keep the organization functioning.   Since many 
organizational routines are the result of an uncodified understanding among employees (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993), disruptions may occur even when resources are not stretched by the departure.  
Remaining workers may lack the tacit knowledge required to carry out the firm’s functions as 
before. 
The organization’s manager likely plays an important role in this process.  Researchers 
have long implicated managers in the creation and maintenance of organizational routines.  For 
example, Barnard (1968:215) states that “the functions of executives relate to all the work 
essential to the vitality and endurance of an organization, so far, at least, as it must be 
accomplished through formal coordination.”  It follows then that managers who are well-versed 
in the organization’s routines and processes may be able to shepard the organization through the 
disruption of routines caused by an important employee’s departure.   
A manager’s tenure is likely an important indicator of his knowledge of organizational 
routines and processes.  Firm-specific knowledge takes time to acquire (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), 
and the longer a manager spends with a firm, the more information, both tacit and explicit, that 
he absorbs.  In addition, over time, the manager will likely shift some organizational routines and 
implement new ones, further deepening the connection between himself and the organization.   
As a result, a longer tenured manager may be well-positioned to reduce the negative 
performance of the organization following employee exit.  He or she may have deeper 
knowledge of the skills and abilities of the firm’s remaining employees (as compared to a 
manager with lower firm-specific experience), and this may assist him or her in reallocating 
workers across tasks.  Longer tenured managers may also have more tacit knowledge about the 
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organization’s operations, which may limit the total loss of uncodified knowledge when an 
important employee exits.  Finally, longer experience with remaining workers may provide the 
manager with knowledge about how to effectively motivate them, which may be important given 
that they may have to expend more effort to compensate for the absence of their former 
colleague. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  The negative effect of key employee departure on the performance of the 
organization will be lower when the organization’s manager has longer tenure. 
The above argument ignores a potentially harmful flip side of stability at the managerial 
level in the face of the change precipitated by the departure of a key employee.  The logic 
underlying the potentially harmful side effects of stability draws on a long line of literature in 
organization theory.  Hannan and Freeman (1984) note that organizations are valued for their 
accountability and reproducibility, giving organizations incentives to create structures and 
routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that maximize each of these qualities.  However, they note that 
these same structures and routines that usually ensure the survival of an organization also make it 
difficult for an organization to consciously change capabilities and strategies in response to 
external challenges without increasing its risk of mortality.  Leonard-Barton (1992) makes a 
similar point using the frame of “core rigidities.”  She argues that an organization’s core 
competencies, normally the source of its competitive advantage, can become a liability in the 
firm focuses too much on the routines and processes surrounding those competencies and does 
not attend to new developments in the external environment.   
With relative ease, we can apply this logic to managerial tenure.  While longer 
managerial tenure may imbue a firm with valuable stability, that stability may become a liability 
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in the face of the sudden shock of a key employee’s departure.  For example, studies in the upper 
echelons literature find that longer tenured CEOs are slower to respond to environmental change 
(e.g. Miller, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), or that firms helmed by longer tenured CEOs 
perform worse in dynamic industries (Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick, 2006).   
Taking these two literatures together suggests that increased managerial tenure can 
become a liability in the face of external shifts.  This danger can also extend to internal 
disturbances, such as the departure of an important lower level employee.  A longer tenured 
manager may mean that the organizations routines remain relatively unchanged over time, 
increasing the amount of tacit knowledge that is required among employees to make routines 
function correctly.  The departure of one key employee may reduce this stock of tacit knowledge 
so substantially that interpersonal coordination becomes difficult, and organizational 
performance suffers.  Additionally, a longer tenured manager means that the organization does 
not have recent experience dealing with change at the managerial level.  This ossification of 
routines for change (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999) in managerial personnel may make it 
difficult for the organization to respond to departures at the employee level. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis, which stands in direct contradiction to 
the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  The negative effect of key employee departure on the performance of the 
organization will be higher when the organization’s manager has longer tenure. 
DATA 
2011 and 2012 National Football League Regular Season 
I test these competing arguments in the context of all regular season games in the 2011 and 2012 
seasons in the National Football League, the most popular league for the sport of American 
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football.  I follow a long tradition of scholars in management, sociology, and economics that 
have used sports as a context to answer questions for which data acquisition is difficult using 
traditional organizations (see Wolfe et al., 2008 for an in-depth review of sports data in social 
science research).   
American football is played between two teams of approximately 50 players each, of 
which only 11 are on the field at any given time.  Of these 50 players, about 25 are starters who 
participate in most of the competition, and the other 25 are substitutes who enter the game when 
the starters are tired, injured, or ineffective.  The object of the game is to score more points than 
the other team by moving the ball across goal lines which are spaced 100 yards apart.  Teams 
advance the ball by running and passing.  In a given season, teams play once a week for a total of 
16 games.   
Of the 50 players on the team, the most important is the starting quarterback.  The team’s 
gameplay flows through this player.  He touches the ball nearly every time he is on the field, 
throwing all of the team’s passes.  The competitive marketplace underscores the importance of 
the quarterback: of the 10 highest paid players in the NFL in 2012, six were quarterbacks 
(Forbes, 2012).  The other four play the position of defensive end, whose primary task is to 
harass the opposing team’s quarterback into poor performance (Forbes, 2012). 
Teams are managed by coaching staffs of approximately 10 individuals, the most senior 
of whom is referred to as the head coach.  The head coach hires the other coaches, sets the 
team’s strategy and culture, and usually serves as the team’s public face.  The lower level 
coaches train the players and determine the team’s tactical approach on a week by week basis. 
To complete the analogy between a football team and traditional organization, one can think of 
the 50 players as employees and the 10 coaches as management.  The team’s quarterback is a key 
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employee carrying out tasks that directly determine organizational performance, and the head 
coach is analogous to a CEO, providing a strategy and culture in which employees may succeed 
or fail (Aime et al., 2010).  In the analyses that follow, we examine whether the quality and 
experience of the head coach softens the blow the team experiences when its starting quarterback 
is unable to play due to injury. 
Hosting this study in the NFL provides us with notable empirical advantages.  First, it is 
extremely difficult for researchers to identify a casual effect of employee departure on 
organizational performance.  Since workers do not quit firms randomly, it is difficult to tell 
whether turnover causes performance, performance causes turnover, or an unobserved third 
factor influences both processes.  Injuries to athletes, on the other hand, are quasi-random events 
that should be less related to organizational performance than turnover while still providing a 
shock similar to that of a traditional departure.  Indeed, athletes, coaches, and media members 
often file injuries under the heading of “bad luck,” underscoring the relatively random nature of 
injuries.  Stuart (2012) pioneers this convenient aspect of injuries in her study of the National 
Hockey League.   
The second advantage of this setting is the ability to observe organizational performance 
objectively and over time while controlling for a host of alternative explanations.  Many studies 
connecting turnover to firm performance use surveys to measure both constructs simultaneously 
or in two waves, and it is understandably difficult for researchers to obtain detailed information 
on other firm and individual-level variables from respondents.  Here, we have an extremely 
objective measure of turnover in the form of injury and several objective measures of 
organizational performance.  The longitudinal nature of the data and the number of variables 
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available allows me to ensure a causal ordering of variables and control for a variety of 
competing explanations for my findings. 
The unit of analysis in this paper is the team-game.  My empirical strategy is to determine 
whether an NFL team performs better or worse following an injury to its starting quarterback and 
then examine whether the tenure of its head coach impacts this main effect.  I analyze data from 
2011 and 2012 because these are the only two seasons for which nfldata.com, my primary data 
source, has information on player injuries.  There are 32 teams in the NFL, each team plays 16 
regular season games per year, and I have two seasons of data.  This results in 1024 team-game 
observations. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable  
Organizational performance – The object of an NFL game is to win by scoring more points than 
the opponent.  Accordingly, I use margin of victory or defeat as my primary indicator of 
organizational performance.      This variable is positive when a team scores more points than its 
opponent and negative when it scores fewer points than its opponent.  Because any team’s 
positive margin of victory is exactly offset by its opponent’s negative margin of defeat, the 
sample mean of this variable equals zero (see Table 16).  For example, the winner of a game 
where the score is 20-14 would have a value of 6 for this variable, while the loser would have a 
value of -6.  In robustness checks, I use alternative measures including win (a dichotomous 
outcome) and points scored (since quarterbacks are mainly tasked with scoring points, this might 
be a more direct measure of the effect that their absence has on organizational performance).  
The values for these variables come from nfldata.com, a for-profit provider of data on NFL 




Employee departure – This dummy variable takes a value of one in the first game that a team’s 
starting quarterback misses due to a specific injury and returns to zero when he is no longer 
listed as “Out” on a team’s injury report. These data come from nfldata.com and were cross 
checked with injury reports for the 2012 season on NFL.com.  Nfldata.com obtains this 
information from weekly injury reports that each team is required to publish in the days leading 
up to a game.  Players with injuries are listed as “Probable”, “Questionable”, “Doubtful”, or 
“Out” on these reports.  Players with the first three categorizations may play in that week’s 
game, but players listed as “Out” will not.  Table 17 lists each of the starting quarterbacks who 
were listed as “Out” during the 2011 and 2012 seasons.  It is possible that these injuries occurred 
in the previous week’s game, but since this is uncertain, I count a player’s first game missed 
when his name appears on one of these reports for consistency.   This measure varies at the team-
game level of analysis. 
Manager tenure – As discussed above, I cast a team’s head coach as its top manager.  A large 
literature in management, sociology, and economics has made this analogy since the head coach 
sets a team’s strategy and culture and is its most visible public face (Wolfe et al., 2005).  I 
identify a coach’s first year with a team from yearly NFL Record and Fact Books (2011, 2012), 
and I measure tenure as the number of years he has spent with his current team.  Only a handful 
of coaches in the sample were promoted from within; results do not change if I measure their 
tenure upon their first entry into the organization or the assumption of the head coaching role.  
Controls 
Part of the reason for the NFL’s popularity in the United States is its attractiveness to gamblers.  
Based on the relative quality of two opponents, casinos and other sports gambling bookkeepers 
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assign a “point spread” to each game.  The point spread indicates by how many points the 
bookkeeper expects a team to win or lose that week’s game.   For example, the game between the 
New Orleans Saints and Green Bay Packers in Week 1 of the 2011 season put the Packers at 4 
point favorites, meaning that the bookkeepers expected the Packers to win by 4 points based on 
their evaluation of the teams’ relative strengths.  Given that NFL gambling is a multi-billion 
dollar a year industry, these bookkeepers have a strong incentive to choose these numbers 
wisely.  This point spread measure makes for a very convenient control variable in our analyses, 
as it parsimoniously tracks the idiosyncratic talent differentials between all opponents in the data.  
Bookkeepers also install an over-under for each game, which is the total number of points that 
the two teams are expected to score.  This serves as another convenient control in the analyses, 
particularly for regressions where the dependent variable is the number of points scored by the 
focal team.  I also include a dummy variable that indicates whether the focal team is the home 
team, as home teams enjoy a number of advantages including crowd support and lack of travel.  
Home team status may also be correlated with holding players out of games due to injury – 
visiting teams may be more likely to keep injured players out of games since it is less likely that 
the visitors will win the game, and visitors run less risk of offending their hometown fans who 
prefer to see the team’s best players when attending games.  These values come from 
nfldata.com, which catalogs point spread and over-under information from nationally syndicated 
betting lines. 
With regard to focal team control variables, while the point spread should account for 
talent differentials between teams, I also include team total salary to capture the amount of 
money the focal team spent on player salaries in the current season.  This helps capture the 
team’s total stock of human capital, which could be correlated with its ability to win games and 
93 
 
keep its quarterback from getting injured.  The NFL places a ceiling on the total amount of 
money that teams can spend on player salaries in order to increase league competitiveness.  NFL 
teams were allowed to spend about $120M each on player salaries in 2011 and 2012.  Salary data 
come from sportrac.com.  I also include a control for # of other injured players.  This counts the 
number of players who do not play quarterback who are listed as “Out” on the current week’s 
injury report.  This control helps account for the possibility that a particularly difficult game in 
the previous week may have resulted in an injury to the team’s quarterback while also reducing 
its chances of performing well in the current week.  I also account for observable head coach 
quality using his Career NFL win %.  I want to ensure that my measure of head coach tenure 
picks up the length of time the head coach has been with the team, rather than the amount of time 
that the quarterback has been with the team.  These two may be highly related since head 
coaches often carefully select the team’s quarterback. Accordingly, I control for Starting QB 
tenure and Head coach / QB tenure overlap. 
Day of the week dummies help account for the time off a team may have between games 
(games are played primarly on Sundays, though some games take place on Monday, Thursday, 
or Saturday) which may affect injury recovery time.  Week of season dummies help control for 
the fact that injuries are more common as the season progresses and players accumulate wear and 
tear that makes injuries more likely. 
I also include a number of opponent-specific controls that help account for the possibility 
that teams may decide whether or not to play a quarterback who is marginally injured based on 
the strength of the current week’s competition.  Opposing head coach career NFL wins, 




METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Table 16 presents sample means and Table 17 provides correlations.  Recall that the unit 
of analysis is the team-game.  As expected, we see that the sample mean of for margin is zero, 
since every winning team’s margin of victory is offset exactly by each losing team’s margin of 
defeat.  Similarly, 49.9% of the game-year observations result in a win, since there was only one 
tie in the NFL in 2011 or 2012.  Turning to the explanatory variables, we see that 6% of teams 
play a game without their starting quarterback during the sample period; 2% of a team’s games 
take place during a quarterback’s first absence due to injury.  We see that the sample mean of 
head coach win percentage is 46% and tenure is 3.46 years.  Quarterbacks tend to have slightly 
shorter tenures than head coaches, with a mean of 3.06 years.  
As expected, the sample value of point spread is zero, since one team’s expected margin 
of victory is offset exactly by its opponent’s expected margin of defeat.  It is interesting to note 
that the average NFL team paid $111M to player salaries in this period.  This number is tightly 
distributed, reflecting the competitive balance in the league which is controlled through the use 
of an upper limit that each team may spend on player salaries.  We also see that the average team 
misses about 1.5 players per game due to injury. 
Before turning to regressions, it is useful to do a simple cross tabulation of the effect of 
starting quarterback injury on team performance.  Table 19 presents mean comparisons for 
probability of victory and the margin of victory/defeat based on starting quarterback injury 
status.  We see that team missing their starting quarterback win only 18% of their games (with an 
average margin of defeat of 9 points); this number drops to 6% (with a 14 point margin) when it 
is the quarterback’s first game out.  These averages are different from their respective 
“untreated” comparison groups at p<.0001. 
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The equation we estimate is the following, where the unit of analysis is the team-game: 
(3)     Yit = β1QBOutit + β2CoachTenureit + β3CoachTenure*QBOutit + β4Controlsit + β5Controlsjt 
+ φday +  δyear + μweek + γi +   εit 
 
Where Yit is the performance of team i in week t, QBOutit is an indicator variable that 
switches to one in the first week that team i’s starting quarterback first misses a game with injury 
and returns to zero when he is no longer listed on the injury report, CoachTenureit is a 
continuous variable, Controlsit are the vector of team i control variables, ControlsOppit is the 
vector of controls related to team i’s opponent, φday is a vector of dummies indicating the day of 
the week that the game is played (Monday, Thursday, Saturday, Sunday),   δyear is a dummy 
taking the value of one in the 2012 season, μweek is a vector of dummies for each of 17 weeks of 
the NFL regular season, γi are a vector of team fixed effects, and εit is a vector of Huber-White 
robust standard errors adjusted for 32 clusters corresponding to each NFL team.   
 Table 20 presents the results of the estimation of equation one.  Model 1shows that an 
injured starting quarterback does not statistically significantly change a team’s margin of victory 
or defeat once we account for control variables.  Model 2 estimates a linear probability model 
where the DV takes a value of one if the focal team wins its game25.  We see that an injured 
starting quarterback reduces a team’s probability of winning its game by 18%, quite an effect 
size, with a p-value of .03.  Model 3 indicates surprisingly that quarterback injury does not have 
a statistically significant impact on the team’s ability to score offensive points.  This result may 
obtain because replacement quarterbacks may be more likely to make mistakes which make it 
easier for the team’s opponents to score more points, while not necessarily inhibiting the scoring 
ability of his own team.   
                                                 
25 A conditional logit model shows similar results; I present linear probability models to ease interpretation of 
coefficients.  Robust standards errors help deal with heteroskedasticity, and there are few predicted probabilities that 
fall outside the [0,1] range. 
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Turning to coach tenure, we see that, conditional on control variables, teams with higher 
tenured coaches are more likely to lose, lose by more points, and score fewer offensive points.  
Unreported regressions show that this relationship is not curvilinear, as the square of coach 
tenure is not statistically significant and the fit of the model does not improve with the addition 
of the squared term.  It appears that NFL teams are invigorated by a change in coach.  The San 
Francisco 49ers, who went from six wins 10 losses in the year before Jim Harbaugh became head 
coach to 13-3 in 2011, his first season, provide an illustrative example, as do the Indianapolis 
Colts, who improved by nine wins after a coaching change in 2012. 
 Turning to interaction effects, we see that the interaction terms between Head coach 
tenure and starting quarterback injury are negative and significant at p<.05 for the outcomes of 
point margin and probability of victory.  These results support the second of the paper’s 
competing hypotheses – managerial tenure appears to exacerbate the negative effect of a key 
employee exit.  Figures 6 and 7 graph these effects to aid interpretation.  In Figure 1, we see that 
a team whose head coach has four years of tenure (approximately the sample mean) can expect 
to lose by about eight additional points when its quarterback is injured.  This effect increases to 
about 12 points (a 50% increase) when we increase coach tenure by about one standard 
deviation.  In Figure 7, we see that the probability that a team wins its game when its quarterback 
is injured declines about 25% when the coach has four years of tenure, and declines about 40% 
when the coach has eight years of tenure.  This represents a 60% decline ( [40-25]/25). 
Robustness tests  
The above models use team-level fixed effects.  Since the primary variable of interest, 
QB Injured, varies at the team-game level of analysis, it is possible to use team-season fixed 
effects instead.  These very restrictive models absorb the main effect of variables, such as Head 
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coach tenure, which do not vary within a given season for a given team.  Models 1-3 in Table 21 
display results from these regressions.  We see that the interaction between head coach tenure 
and quarterback injury becomes insignificant for margin of victory or defeat but retains 
significance at the 10% level when the dependent variable used is probability of victory.   
While the above regressions include main effect controls for observable coach quality (in 
the form of Coach career NFL win %) and co-evolution of the quarterback’s team specific 
knowledge and routines and the coach’s team-specific knowledge and routines (in the form of 
QB tenure and Head coach / QB tenure overlap, respectively), it is possible that the interaction 
term used to discern between the two competing hypotheses (Head coach tenure * QB Injured) 
picks up some of these effects.  Accordingly, I estimate additional models that include an 
interaction of the QB Injured variable with each of these three additional control variables.  As 
can be seen in Models 4-6 in Table 21, results do not change substantially from those shown in 
Table 20, either in effect size or statistical significance; the p-value on the interaction in Model 4 
is .059. 
Inspecting the credibility of the injury variable 
To evaluate the credibility of the randomness of the quarterback injury variable, it is 
useful to inspect Table 18.  A potential concern is that a team may withhold quarterbacks from 
ex ante unwinnable and/or meaningless games after the outcome of its season has already been 
decided (i.e. it is clear that the team will miss the postseason).  Table 18 suggests that this latter 
point is probably not a concern – although most injuries occur in the latter part of the season 
(likely due to cumulative wear and tear on player’s bodies), we do not see injuries clustered in 
Week 17, when teams often know whether or not they will be advancing to the postseason and 
98 
 
may strategically withhold players because they have already decided that the game is 
meaningless or unwinnable.   
It is also useful to see how the effect of a quarterback’s injury varies over time.  For 
example, although a quarterback may first appear on a team’s injury report in week t, the injury 
likely occurred in week t-1, and may have affected the team’s performance at that time as well.  
If this is the case, we may need to alter the timing of our measurement of quarterback injury in 
Equation 1.  Figure 8 presents the estimates of an OLS regression using a vector of dummies to 
capture weeks since a team’s quarterback was first listed on the injury report.  The counterfactual 
group in this regression is all team-games where the team’s quarterback does not miss a game 
during the season due to injury.  Figure 8 shows that there is a significant decline in team 
performance in week t-1.  Accordingly, we re-estimate Equation 1, moving the time of treatment 
backward by one week for all teams that experience a quarterback injury.  Results remain 
unchanged. 
Figure 8 is itself interesting.  While it makes sense that the negative effect of quarterback 
injury is mostly confined to the week of injury (Table 18 suggests that most injuries cause 
quarterbacks to miss only one game), it does not appear that teams incur a “reintegration” 
penalty as the quarterback rejoins the team after a week’s absence.  It is also important to note 
that teams experiencing quarterback injury are not categorically worse than other teams in the 
NFL during this time period.  If this were the case, the line in Figure 8 would be significantly 
different from zero at many points on the graph, not merely those at the time of injury.  This 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to examine a research question that flows from the 
combination of the literatures regarding organizational routines and employee turnover – do 
longer tenured managers attenuate or exacerbate the negative short-term effects of key employee 
turnover?  The answer to this question is not theoretically clear ex ante, so I developed 
competing hypotheses related to attenuation and exacerbation.  To adjudicate between them, I 
collected and analyzed data from the 2011 and 2012 seasons in the National Football League, 
casting the team’s quarterback as a key employee and the team’s head coach as its top manager.  
Using quarterback injuries to identify quasi-random turnover events, I find support for the 
exacerbation argument: teams whose coaches have longer tenure exhibit worse performance 
following quarterback injury than their counterparts that have shorter tenure.  These results are 
robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables for coach quality and quarterback tenure. 
I see two primary inferences related to this result.  The first relates to the 
microfoundations of organizational rigidity (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
An enduring question in management research is why organizations fail to adapt to changing 
conditions in their competitive environments.  Leonard-Barton (1992) posits that a firm’s core 
competencies become its core rigidities as the firm becomes too routinized in today’s successful 
processes to anticipate tomorrow’s changes to its industry. The results here present a related but 
different explanation for a slightly different phenonmenon – organizations with longer tenured 
managers may become so accustomed to current routines that the skills needed to respond to 
change become ossified.  As a result, when a problem, such as the departure of a key employee, 
presents itself, organizations with longer tenured managers are less able to react appropriately.  
While Leonard-Barton (1992) and others suggests that high performing organizations are unable 
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to see upcoming threats (Christiansen and Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990), the results 
here suggest that organizations with longer tenured managers are less able to cope with problems 
that are within view and fully realized.  
Control variables help me rule out an important alternative explanation relating to the 
coevolution of managerial and employee tenure.  It is possible that a coach could achieve longer 
tenure (i.e. not get fired) by virtue of being in the “right place at the right time” with a skilled 
quarterback, and when that quarterback gets injured, the coach’s lack of quality is revealed.  
Including a measure of coach and quarterback tenure overlap as well as a measure of the 
quarterback’s tenure with the team helps me rule out this important competing explanation.  
A primary contribution of this article is to add to the growing literature that underscores 
the hazards of organizational stability.  Chen, Williams, and Agarwal (2011) note that 
diversifying entrants into new industries are better able than other firms to withstand 
technological change, perhaps due to the experience in organizational change that they gained by 
entering the industry in the first place.  The results here suggest a similar logic at the micro level 
of analysis – firms that have not undergone change at the managerial level may benefit from 
stability, but when change occurs at the employee level due to turnover, the organization may 
suffer for its lack of experience with sudden adjustments. 
The findings here also have important implications for the theory and management of 
employee turnover.  The fact that longer tenured managers do not, on average, ameliorate the 
negative effect of turnover is perhaps surprising and underscores the practical challenge that 
turnover presents to organizations.  If stability at one level of the organization does not 
unambiguously provide benefits in the face of disruption at other levels, organizations must 
carefully plan for transition events both within and across organization levels.  It seems quite 
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likely that cross-level (i.e. manager and subordinate) analyses will continue to bear interesting 
fruit for researchers interested in the connection between turnover and unit-level performance.  
Future work examining the connection between managers and turnover could make strides well 
beyond those in this paper by specifying specific leader actions that may help reduce the 
negative effect of turnover.  Do leaders who are more or less empowering of employees help 
buffer the negative effects of turnover?  What about transformational leaders?  These are 
interesting topics to pursue in future work. 
It is important to address the limitations of this study which open up other opportunities 
for other future scholarly work.  The first is the generalizability of the setting.  While 
professional sports is a convenient empirical laboratory for studying management questions and 
has been utilized by a number of prior scholars (see Wolfe et al., 2005 for a summary), it is an 
idiosyncratic context.  The fact that individual performance is easier to observe may cause 
employees to behave differently than in traditional organizations.  While on-field performance 
has the characteristic of more traditional organizational performance metrics like efficiency and 
productivity, the analogy to financial performance (the ultimate goal of most organizations 
studied by management scholars) is less clear.  Additionally, injuries, while they represent a 
convenient empirical opportunity due to their quasi-random nature, do not have a direct analog in 
traditional organizations (although the CEO hospitalization events studied by Bennedson, Perez-
Gonzalez & Wolfenson, 2011 are similar in character – a key employee departs and then returns 
to the organization in a semi-random fashion).    
The second limitation is the data generating process surrounding the variable of head 
coach tenure.  In the NFL, where head coach tenure is often short, the tenure of a head coach is 
determined by many of the same processes that affect his team’s current performance.  I have 
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utilized panel data and tried to include many of the omitted variables that might bias results (such 
as the coach’s observable quality in the form of win percentage, the quality of the team in terms 
of its total investment in human capital, the tenure of the team’s quarterback, and the co-tenure 
of the coach and quarterback).  At a basic level, however, head coaches are not randomly 
assigned lengths of tenure, so inferences related to this variable must be made with caution.   
 Despite these limitations, this paper makes important contributions to the study of 
employee turnover, the microfoundations of organizational change, and role of managers in 
organizational performance.  The key insight that I provide is that organizational stability has a 
negative side effect – it ossifies the routines that organizations use and the skills that managers 
need to respond to sudden, disruptive change.  My hope is that this study spurs additional work 



















































The regression underlying this figure is the same as Equation 1 (presented in Table 11), except Deathit has been 
replaced by a set of interactions between 1) a dummy indicating membership in the treatment group that experiences 
the unexpected death of a colleague and 2) a set of dummies indicating the amount of time between the current 
period and the death of individual i’s colleague.  The dependent variable is the logged value of individual i’s total 
earnings in year t.  The regression includes individual fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by each of 
































The regression underlying this figure is Equation 2, whose results are displayed in Table 12.  The numbers provided 
correspond to the coefficient estimates in Table 12.  The thin lines displayed here correspond to 90% confidence 
intervals for each coefficient.  Lack of overlap between these lines indicates statistically significant difference in 
coefficients at p=.05.  Wald tests indicate statistically significant differences between the female-female coefficient 

























































































Figure 6:  Interaction of Coach Tenure and QB Injury on Margin of Defeat / Victory 
 
 








































Figure 7:  Interaction of Coach Tenure and QB Injury on Probability of Victory 
 
 





































Figure 8:  How the Effect of QB Injury Varies over Time 
 
 
Note:  Values in chart come from an OLS regression with same control variables as Equation 3.  Experimental time 






































Table 1: Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
 
VARIABLE NAME Mean Std Dev # Obs
Dependent Variables - Individual Level     
Joins startup in following year? (Dummy) 0.009 0.094 750937
Joins different established firm in following year? (Dummy) 0.033 0.178 750937
Independent Variables     
Key Endogenous Variable - Firm Level     
# Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly26 <.05  750937
# Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by # attys) 11.232 63.153 750937
Instrumental Variable - Firm Level     
# Competitor partner attorneys that die unexpectedly 0.100 0.472 750937
Other Independent Variables - Individual Level     
Annual earnings 114,798 246,050 750937
Employee age (years) 41.903 10.215 750937
Tenure (years) 4.440 2.814 750937
Partner (Dummy) 0.379 0.485 750937
Other Independent Variables - Firm Level     
Total # competitor firms that fail 0.190 0.524 750937
Total # competitor firms that fail (weighted by # attys) 23.077 638.637 750937
# Competitor firms that fail following decline 0.172 0.486 750937
# Competitor firms that fail following decline (weighted by # attys) 11.845 97.773 750937
Max annual earnings in the firm (wage ceiling) 496,644 1,282,689 750937
# Employees hired from failed firms 0.119 0.843 750937
Revenue per attorney 81,128 58,386 750937
# Attorneys 254.472 375.879 750937
Coefficient of variation (wages) 1.611 25.352 750937
Avg age, competitor employees 39.667 3.449 750937
Turnover rate, competitor employees 0.066 0.089 750937
Startup rate, competitor employees 0.012 0.052 750937
# Competitor firms 9.583 14.437 750937
Avg revenue per attorney, competitor firms 74,398 45,388 750937
# law firms in the MSA 19,859 16,356 750937
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail unexpectedly following 
death of partner attorney 18 
<.05  750937
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail unexpectedly w/out death of 
partner attorney 
0.297 1.288 750937
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail following decline 3.271 8.102 750937
Each observation is an individual-year. 




                                                 




Table 2:  OLS Estimates: Linear Probability Models Predicting Entrepreneurship and Mobility (Endogenous Regressors)  
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Robust standard errors clustered by employee-employer dyad in parentheses.  * p-value<.05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value<.001, two-tailed tests. 
Sample mean of dependent variable
# Competitor firms that fail (weighted by log # attys) -0.0014 (0.0001) *** -0.0006 (0.0002) **
# Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly 
(weighted by log # attys)
-0.0015 (0.0001) *** -0.0008 (0.0002) ***
# Competitor firms that fail following decline 
(weighted by log # attys)
-0.0004 (0.0002) -0.0001 (0.0005)
Annual earnings (100,000s) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0017 (0.0002) *** -0.0017 (0.0000) ***
Annual earnings^2 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) ***
Age -0.0014 (0.0003) *** -0.0013 (0.0003) *** 0.0168 (0.0008) *** 0.0168 (0.0008) ***
Age^2 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) *** -0.0002 (0.0000) *** -0.0002 (0.0000) ***
Partner (Dummy) -0.0001 (0.0004) -0.0001 (0.0004) -0.0163 (0.0009) *** -0.0163 (0.0009) ***
Max annual earnings in the firm (100,000s) 0.0032 (0.0004) *** 0.0032 (0.0004) *** 0.0014 (0.0003) *** 0.0014 (0.0000) ***
# attorneys hired from failed firms 0.0005 (0.0001) *** 0.0005 (0.0001) *** -0.0014 (0.0003) *** -0.0014 (0.0003) ***
Revenue per employee (100,000s) -0.0005 (0.0009) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0021 (0.0009) * -0.0021 (0.0000) ***
Coefficient of variation (wages) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Avg age, competitor  attorneys 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Turnover rate, competitor attorneys -0.0081 (0.0015) *** -0.0083 (0.0015) *** -0.0232 (0.0030) *** -0.0231 (0.0030) ***
Startup rate, competitor attorneys 0.1230 (0.0053) *** 0.1221 (0.0052) *** -0.0232 (0.0044) *** -0.0236 (0.0044) ***
# Competitor firms -0.0102 (0.0005) *** -0.0101 (0.0005) *** 0.0297 (0.0008) *** 0.0298 (0.0008) ***
Avg revenue per employee, competitor firms  (100,000s) -0.0028 (0.0005) *** -0.0028 (0.0005) *** 0.0011 (0.0009) 0.0011 (0.0000) ***
# law firms in the MSA (100s) 0.1605 (0.0100) *** 0.1598 (0.0100) *** -0.0666 (0.0142) *** -0.0672 (0.0001) ***
# law firms in the MSA^2 -0.0014 (0.0001) *** -0.0014 (0.0001) *** 0.0009 (0.0002) *** 0.0009 (0.0000) ***

































Table 3:  Two Stage Least Squares Estimates: Linear Probability Models Predicting Entrepreneurship and Mobility 
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Robust standard errors clustered by employee-employer dyad in parentheses. * p-value<.05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value<.001, two-tailed tests. 
 
Sample mean of dependent variable
# Competitor partner attorneys that die unexpectedly 0.0221 (0.0024) ***
# Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys) 0.0382 (0.0103) *** -0.0202 (0.0266)
# Competitor firms that fail following decline (weighted by log # attys) -0.0037 (0.0007) *** -0.0014 (0.0016)
Annual earnings (100,000s) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0017 (0.0000) ***
Annual earnings^2 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) ***
Age -0.0073 (0.0016) *** 0.0199 (0.0040) ***
Age^2 0.0000 (0.0000) ** -0.0002 (0.0000) ***
Partner (Dummy) 0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0166 (0.0010) ***
Max annual earnings in the firm (100,000s) 0.0034 (0.0005) *** 0.0013 (0.0000) ***
# attorneys hired from failed firms -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0011 (0.0005) *
Revenue per employee (100,000s) -0.0006 (0.0009) -0.0020 (0.0000) ***
Coefficient of variation (wages) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Avg age, competitor  attorneys 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Turnover rate, competitor  attorneys -0.0195 (0.0032) *** -0.0178 (0.0077) *
Startup rate, competitor  attorneys 0.0810 (0.0115) *** -0.0034 (0.0278)
# Competitor firms -0.0112 (0.0005) *** 0.0303 (0.0010) ***
Avg revenue per employee, competitor firms  (100,000s) -0.0037 (0.0005) *** 0.0016 (0.0000) ***
# law firms in the MSA (100s) 0.2009 (0.0148) *** -0.0881 (0.0003) ***
# law firms in the MSA^2 -0.0025 (0.0003) *** 0.0015 (0.0000) ***
Tenure and firm size dummies?
Year dummies?
Employee-employer fixed effect?
Number of observations / Number of groups
R-squared within 0.05
Kleibergen & Paap (2006) Wald F Statistic 193.867
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Table 4:  Two Stage Least Squares Estimates: Linear Probability Models Predicting Entrepreneurship and Mobility 
(Interactions) 
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Standard errors (calculated with 10,000 bootstraps) in parentheses.   
† p-value<.10, * p-value<.05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value<.001, two-tailed tests. 
Note: Each model contains all control variables included in Table 3.  # Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys) uses the 
predicted value calculated in the first stage of Table 3.   
 
Sample mean of dependent variable
Annual earnings*# Competitor firms that fail 
unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys)
H2 0.0004 (0.0002) † 0.0007 (0.0002) **
Annual earnings^2*# Competitor firms that fail 
unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys)
H2 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Max annual earnings in the firm*# Competitor firms 
that fail unexpectedly (weighted by log # attys)
H3 -0.0029 (0.0009) ** -0.0034 (0.0010) ***
# Competitor firms that fail unexpectedly (weighted by 
log # attys)
0.0382 (0.0103) *** 0.0379 (0.0094) *** 0.0364 (0.0094) *** 0.0356 (0.0094) ***
Annual earnings (100,000s) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Annual earnings^2 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Max annual earnings in the firm (100,000s) 0.0034 (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Control variables?

































Table 5:  Multinomal Logit Model Predicting Entrepreneurship and Mobility (Robustness Test Approach) 
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Remaining with same firm is reference category. Choice to exit industry also estimated but excluded for brevity.  




β SE Odds β SE Odds
Competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after death of partner atty(s) 1.9759 (0.1168) *** 7.2131 -0.1319 (0.0868) 0.8764
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail unexpectedly, no death of partner atty 0.3251 (0.0108) *** 1.3841 -0.0064 (0.0072) 0.9936
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail following decline -0.0452 (0.0031) *** 0.9558 -0.0085 (0.0013) *** 0.9916
Annual earnings ($100,000s) -0.0010 (0.0000) *** 0.9990 -0.0043 (0.0000) *** 0.9957
Annual earnings^2 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 1.0000 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 1.0000
Max annual earnings in the firm ($1s) 0.0001 (0.0000) *** 1.0001 0.0001 (0.0000) *** 1.0001
Includes control variables from Table 3?




p-value of Hausman test, IIA Assumption
YES
0.077








Table 6:  Multinomal Logit Model Predicting Entrepreneurship and Mobility (Robustness Test Approach - Interactions) 
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Remaining with same firm is reference category. Choice to exit industry also estimated but excluded for brevity.  
Robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. * p-value<.05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value<.001, two-tailed tests. 
  
Annual earnings*Competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly 
after death of partner atty(s)
H2 0.4850 (0.8070) -0.7490 (0.6860)
Annual earnings^2*Competitor firm (large set) fails 
unexpectedly after death of partner atty(s)
H2 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Max annual earnings in the firm*Competitor firm (large set) fails 
unexpectedly after death of partner atty(s)
H3 -0.0070 (0.0013) *** -0.0063 (0.0013) ***
Competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after death of 
partner atty(s)
1.9759 (0.1168) *** 2.4688 (0.4245) *** 4.1333 (0.3336) *** 4.5336 (0.4577) ***
Annual earnings ($100,000s) -0.0010 (0.0000) *** -0.0960 (0.0225) *** -0.0997 (0.0229) *** -0.0992 (0.0228) ***
Annual earnings^2 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) ***
Max annual earnings in the firm ($1s) 0.0001 (0.0000) *** 0.0001 (0.0000) *** 0.0001 (0.0000) *** 0.0001 (0.0000) ***
Control variables from Table 3?
Race, gender, in/out MSA, state, year dummies?
Number of observations
Log pseudolikelihood  (p-value of LR Test nested w/ Model 1)
McFadden's Pseudo R-squared 0.0768 0.0768 0.0770 0.0771
750,937 750,937 750,937 750,937
-281,977 -281,967* -281,894* -281,887*
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Table 7:  OLS Estimates: Linear Probability Models Predicting Mobility and Entrepreneurship (Robustness Test Approach) 
 
Each observation is an individual-year.  
Robust standard errors clustered by employee-employer dyad in parentheses. * p-value<.05, ** p-value <.01, *** p-value<.001, 
two-tailed tests. 
 
Sample mean of dependent variable
Competitor firm (large set) fails unexpectedly after death of 
partner atty(s)
0.0172 (0.0023) *** 0.0159 (0.0024) *** -0.0014 (0.0032) -0.0016 (0.0032)
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail unexpectedly, no death of 
partner atty
0.0024 (0.0001) *** -0.0013 (0.0002) ***
# Competitor firms (large set) that fail following decline -0.0005 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0001)
Tenure and firm size dummies?


































Table 8:  Criteria Used in the Firm-Level Matching Procedure 
Theoretical Concept Empirical Measure Coarsening Criteria 
Location State Exact match 
Location Metropolitan Statistical Area Exact match 
Size # Attorneys, t-1 NALP size categories: 5-25 attys, 26-100, 101-250, 251-
500, 501-1000, >1000 Size # Attorneys, t-2 
Performance Revenue per attorney, t-1 From $50k to $1M in $50k 
increments Performance Revenue per attorney, t-2 
Female representation % of partners who are female, t-1 0-5%, 5-10%, 10-20%, 20-
30%, 30-40%, 40-50%, 50-
80%, 80-100% Female representation % of partners who are female, t-2 





Table 9:  Outcome of the Firm-Level Matching Procedure 










Variables Used in Coarsened 
Matching               
# Lawyers, t 62 48.90 92.98 62 42.92 80.63 -0.38
# Lawyers, t-1 62 44.55 84.92 62 40.98 76.01 -0.25
Avg earnings per lawyer, t 62 $100,562 $27,639 62 $98,040 $28,023 -0.50
Avg earnings per lawyer, t-1 62 $98,792 $31,307 62 $98,418 $32,110 -0.07
% Partners who are female 62 0.21 0.21 62 0.22 0.21 0.06
MSA and state 62 Exact match         
Other Key Variables               
Avg Age 62 42.33 3.92 62 41.67 4.67 -0.85
Avg Tenure (left censored) 62 2.96 1.83 62 3.10 2.00 0.40
% Turnover 62 0.06 0.10 62 0.10 0.20 0.56
% of employees who are female 62 0.58 0.35 62 0.55 0.21 -0.59
Female death? 62 0.16 0.37 62 0.16 0.37 0.00
Each observation in this table is a firm-year.   
The treatment condition is a firm-year in which an individual in the top third of the firm’s 
pay distribution dies unexpectedly.   




Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Individual-Level Regression Sample 
Description       Obs       Mean Std. Dev.
Variables Measured at the Individual Level     
Annual Earnings 47905 $102,198 $160,220
Individual age 47905 42.87 10.30
Is the worker female? 47905 0.50 0.50
Tenure (left-censored) 47905 3.61 3.16
Partner? (imputed – wage percentile >.66 and age>34) 47905 0.49 0.50
Does the worker experience a death? 47905 0.51 0.50
Did the worker experience a death in a prior period? 47905 0.25 0.43
Is the worker a female who experienced a death in a prior period? 47905 0.12 0.32
Is the worker a male who experiences a death in a prior period? 47905 0.13 0.34
Does the worker experience the death of a female in a prior period? 47905 0.02 0.14
Does the worker experience the death of a male in a prior period? 47905 0.23 0.42
Female experienced death of female colleague in a prior period? 47905 0.01 0.10
Male experienced death of female colleague in a prior period? 47905 0.01 0.10
Female experienced death of male colleague in a prior period? 47905 0.11 0.31
Male experienced death of male colleague in a prior period? 47905 0.12 0.33
Variables Measured at the Firm Level     
% Turnover 47905 0.07 0.15
Coefficient of variation 47905 1.45 5.21
Revenue per attorney 47905 $72,643 $30,588
# of Attorneys 47905 234.77 438.23
# Law firms in the MSA 47905 9982.38 7914.42
Avg Age 47905 40.35 3.13
% of firm's attorneys that are female 47905 0.50 0.17
% of firm's partners that are female 47905 0.36 0.20
Male-female wage ratio 47905 0.36 0.23
The unit of analysis in this table is the individual-year.  The table includes members of the treatment and control samples. 
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Table 11:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Individual Fixed Effects 
 
DV:  Log(Taxable annual earnings)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t 
Death occurred in this or previous period (Dummy) 0.030 0.015 1.97
Partner? (imputed) 0.279 0.011 25.89
% Turnover 0.072 0.026 2.78
Coefficient of variation -0.001 0.000 -1.72
Revenue per attorney 2.99E-006 8.94E-007 3.34
Log(# attorneys) 0.038 0.005 7.07
# of Law firms in the MSA -7.09E-006 4.28E-006 -1.65
# Law firms in the MSA ^2 2.59E-010 1.59E-010 1.63
Avg age of firm's lawyers -0.013 0.003 -4.6
% of firm's lawyers that are female 0.298 0.056 5.32
% of firm's partners that are female -0.113 0.047 -2.41
Ratio of male wages to female wages in the firm 0.011 0.024 0.44
Exits firm in next period?  (Dummy) YES 
14 tenure dummies? YES 
18 person age dummies? YES 
Year dummies? YES 
Within R-Squared 0.383 
Number of individual-years 47905 
Number of unique individuals 6368 
 
There are the results of the estimation of Equation 1.  Models include individual fixed 




Table 12:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Individual Fixed Effects 
 
DV:  Log(Taxable annual earnings)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t 
Female experienced death of female colleague 0.08 0.02 4.01 
Male experienced death of female colleague -0.02 0.04 -0.59 
Female experienced death of male colleague 0.03 0.01 2.24 
Male experienced death of male colleague 0.03 0.03 1.04 
Partner? (imputed) 0.28 0.01 26.14 
% Turnover 0.07 0.03 2.79 
Coefficient of variation 0.00 0.00 -1.72 
Revenue per attorney 2.99E-006 8.96E-007 3.33 
Log(# attorneys) 0.04 0.01 7.04 
# of Law firms in the MSA -7.11E-006 4.28E-006 -1.66 
# Law firms in the MSA ^2 2.59E-010 1.60E-010 1.62 
Avg age of firm's lawyers -0.01 0.00 -4.47 
% of firm's lawyers that are female 0.30 0.06 5.37 
% of firm's partners that are female -0.11 0.05 -2.42 
Ratio of male wages to female wages in the firm 0.01 0.02 0.44 
Exits firm in next period?  (Dummy) YES 
14 tenure dummies? YES 
18 person age dummies? YES 
Year dummies? YES 
Within R-Squared 0.383 
Number of individual-years 47905 
Number of unique individuals 6368 
 
There are the results of the estimation of Equation 2.  Models include individual fixed 





Table 13:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Individual Fixed Effects 
DV:  Log(Taxable annual earnings)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t 
Female experienced death of female colleague*Within-firm earnings percentile at time of death 0.21 0.12 1.67
Male experienced death of female colleague*Within-firm earnings percentile at time of death 0.14 0.07 1.9
Female experienced death of male colleague*Within-firm earnings percentile at time of death 0.25 0.06 4.42
Male experienced death of male colleague *Within-firm earnings percentile at time of death 0.18 0.11 1.6
Female experienced death of female colleague -0.03 0.07 -0.47
Male experienced death of female colleague -0.11 0.07 -1.5
Female experienced death of male colleague -0.07 0.03 -2.22
Male experienced death of male colleague -0.09 0.06 -1.54
Partner? (imputed) 0.28 0.01 26.26
% Turnover 0.07 0.03 2.78
Coefficient of variation 0.00 0.00 -1.74
Revenue per attorney 2.98E-006 8.96E-007 3.32
Log(# attorneys) 0.04 0.01 7.04
# of Law firms in the MSA -6.57E-006 4.19E-006 -1.57
# Law firms in the MSA ^2 2.44E-010 1.59E-010 1.53
Avg age of firm's lawyers -0.01 0.00 -4.39
% of firm's lawyers that are female 0.29 0.06 5.2
% of firm's partners that are female -0.11 0.05 -2.38
Ratio of male wages to female wages in the firm 0.01 0.02 0.3
Exits firm in next period?  (Dummy) YES 
14 tenure dummies? YES 
18 person age dummies? YES 
Year dummies? YES 
Within R-Squared 0.383 
Number of individual-years 47905 
Number of unique individuals 6368 
 
These are the results of the estimation of Equation 2 with an additional interaction with the individual’s within-firm earnings 
percentile at the time of death.   
Models include individual fixed effects.   
Note that the direct effect of the interacted variable is not estimated as it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect.   
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in 124 treated and control firms are provided. 
126 
 
Table 14:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Individual Fixed Effects 
DV:  Log(Taxable annual earnings)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t 
Female experienced death of female colleague*% of firm's partners that are female at time of death 0.06 0.08 0.72
Male experienced death of female colleague *% of firm's partners that are female at time of death 0.17 0.14 1.17
Female experienced death of male colleague* % of firm's partners that are female at time of death 0.10 0.05 1.95
Male experienced death of male colleague *% of firm's partners that are female at time of death 0.30 0.09 3.45
Female experienced death of female colleague 0.05 0.05 0.87
Male experienced death of female colleague -0.09 0.07 -1.26
Female experienced death of male colleague -0.01 0.02 -0.42
Male experienced death of male colleague -0.06 0.04 -1.73
Partner? (imputed) 0.28 0.01 25.85
% Turnover 0.07 0.03 2.9
Coefficient of variation 0.00 0.00 -1.68
Revenue per attorney 0.00 0.00 3.32
Log(# attorneys) 0.04 0.01 7.24
# of Law firms in the MSA 0.00 0.00 -1.86
# Law firms in the MSA ^2 0.00 0.00 1.85
Avg age of firm's lawyers -0.01 0.00 -4.42
% of firm's lawyers that are female 0.28 0.06 5.01
% of firm's partners that are female -0.11 0.04 -2.39
Ratio of male wages to female wages in the firm 0.01 0.02 0.37
Exits firm in next period?  (Dummy) YES 
14 tenure dummies? YES 
18 person age dummies? YES 
Year dummies? YES 
Within R-Squared 0.383 
Number of individual-years 47905 
Number of unique individuals 6368 
These are the results of the estimation of Equation 2 with an additional interaction with the percentage of the firm’s partners 
(imputed) that are female at the time of the death.   
Models include individual fixed effects.   
Note that the direct effect of the interacted variable is not estimated as it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect.   




Table 15:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Individual Fixed Effects 
DV:  Log(Taxable annual earnings)      Coef.   Std. Err.      t 
Female experienced death of female colleague *Age at time of colleague death 0.0046 0.0019 2.45
Male experienced death of female colleague * Age at time of colleague death -0.0062 0.0027 -2.28
Female experienced death of male colleague * Age at time of colleague death 0.0004 0.0008 0.52
Male experienced death of male colleague * Age at time of colleague death -0.0041 0.0015 -2.79
Female experienced death of female colleague -0.12 0.08 -1.38
Male experienced death of female colleague  0.25 0.13 1.96
Female experienced death of male colleague 0.01 0.03 0.39
Male experienced death of male colleague  0.21 0.06 3.60
Partner? (imputed) 0.28 0.01 26.14
% Turnover 0.07 0.03 2.76
Coefficient of variation 0.00 0.00 -1.71
Revenue per attorney 0.00 0.00 3.34
Log(# attorneys) 0.04 0.01 7.16
# of Law firms in the MSA 0.00 0.00 -1.74
# Law firms in the MSA ^2 0.00 0.00 1.67
Avg age of firm's lawyers -0.01 0.00 -4.42
% of firm's lawyers that are female 0.30 0.06 5.35
% of firm's partners that are female -0.11 0.05 -2.34
Ratio of male wages to female wages in the firm 0.01 0.02 0.55
Exits firm in next period?  (Dummy) YES 
14 tenure dummies? YES 
18 person age dummies? YES 
Year dummies? YES 
Within R-Squared 0.383 
Number of individual-years 47905 
Number of unique individuals 6368 
 
These are the results of the estimation of Equation 2 with an additional interaction with the individual’s age at the time of 
death.   
Models include individual fixed effects.   
Note that the direct effect of the interacted variable is not estimated as it is absorbed by the individual fixed effect.   
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in 124 treated and control firms are provided. 
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Table 16:  Sample Means 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables           
Margin 1024 0.00 15.68 -58.00 58.00 
Win? 1024 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Points Scored by Team 1024 22.47 10.38 0.00 62.00 
Explanatory Variables           
Starting QB Injured? 1024 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Starting QB Injured? (first game out) 1024 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Head coach tenure 1024 3.42 3.32 0.00 13.00 
Head coach career NFL wins 1024 45.50 48.18 0.00 175.00 
Head coach career NFL win % 1024 0.46 0.23 0.00 0.81 
Head coach career NFL experience 1024 10.48 7.59 0.00 27.00 
Controls           
Over-Under 1024 44.12 4.48 33.00 56.00 
Point spread 1024 0.00 6.41 -20.50 20.50 
Home team? 1024 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
# of other injured players (first game out) 1024 0.56 0.84 0.00 6.00 
# of other injured players 1024 1.59 1.44 0.00 7.00 
Team total salary ($M) 1024 $111.16 8.55 91.90 123.55 
Opposing head coach career NFL wins 1024 45.44 48.25 -4.00 175.00 
Opposing team total salary ($M) 1024 $111.16 8.55 91.90 123.55 
Opposing team's total wins last year 1024 8.00 3.09 2.00 15.00 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Margin 1.00
2 Win? 0.77 1.00
3 Points Scored by Team 0.76 0.58 1.00
4 Head coach career NFL wins 0.14 0.10 0.15 1.00
5 Head coach career NFL win % 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.46 1.00
6 Head coach tenure 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.63 0.41 1.00
7 Head coach career NFL experience 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.77 0.31 0.37 1.00
8 Starting QB Injured? (first game out) -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 1.00
9 Starting QB Injured? -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.16 0.51 1.00
10 Over-Under 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.15 -0.01 0.18 0.16 -0.09 -0.11 1.00
11 Point spread -0.47 -0.42 -0.35 -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 -0.12 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00
12 Home team? 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.38 1.00
13 # of other injured players (first game o-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.05 1.00
14 # of other injured players 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.63 1.00
15 Team total salary ($M) 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.21 -0.25 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
16 Opposing head coach career NFL wins -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.15 0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 1.00
17 Opposing team total salary ($M) -0.16 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 1.00
18 Opposing team's total wins last year -0.15 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.35 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.22 0.21 1.00
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2011 7 Jason Campbell QB OAK KC Collarbone 9 
2011 8 Sam Bradford QB STL NO Ankle 1 
2011 11 Matt Cassel QB KC NE Right Hand 1 
2011 12 Jay Cutler QB CHI OAK Right Thumb 1 
2011 13 Michael Vick QB PHI SEA Ribs 1 
2011 15 Colt McCoy QB CLE ARI Head 3 
2012 5 Jake Locker QB TEN MIN Left Shoulder 4 
2012 6 Matt Cassel QB KC TB Concussion 1 
2012 9 Brady Quinn QB KC SD Head 2 
2012 7 Kevin Kolb QB ARI MIN Ribs 4 
2012 11 Michael Vick QB PHI WAS Concussion 1 
2012 11 
Ben 
Roethlisberger QB PIT BAL Right Shoulder 3 
2012 11 Jay Cutler QB CHI SF Concussion 1 
2012 12 Byron Leftwich QB PIT CLE Ribs 2 
2012 17 Brandon Weeden QB CLE PIT Right shoulder 1 
2012 17 Carson Palmer QB OAK SD Ribs 1 
Note:  There are 16 total injury events.  Byron Leftwich was starting in place of Ben Roethlisberger when 
Leftwich was injured in Week 12 of 2012, and Brady Quinn was starting in place of Matt Cassell when 




Table 19:  Mean Comparisons for Victory and Margin Based on Starting Quarterback 
Injury 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. T-Stat P-value 
DV: Win 
No QB Injury 965 0.518 0.016 5.000 0.000
QB Injured 59 0.186 0.051     
Combined 1024 0.499 0.016     
DV:  
Margin 
No QB Injury 965 0.585 0.505 4.880 0.000
QB Injured 59 -9.576 1.573     
Combined 1024 0.000 0.490     
DV:  
Win 
All other team-games 1008 0.506 0.016 3.538 0.000
QB Injured (first week out) 16 0.063 0.063     
Combined 1024 0.499 0.016     
DV:  
Margin 
All other team-games 1008 0.224 0.493 3.653 0.000
QB Injured (first week out) 16 -14.125 3.001     




Table 20:  Fixed Effect OLS Regressions of Regular Season Game Outcomes 
 
Note:  Unit of analysis is team-game.  1,024 observations representing all 612 regular season games played in the National Football League in 2011 and 
2012. Robust standard errors clustered by team are presented in parenthesis.  †p<.10,* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001 Two tailed test 
 
  
Head coach tenure*QB Injured -1.217 (0.601) * -0.040 (0.018) * -0.315 (0.436)
Head coach team tenure -3.775 (0.945) *** -0.088 (0.028) ** -2.131 (0.512) *** -3.964 (0.886) *** -0.094 (0.026) *** -2.180 (0.494) ***
Starting QB Injured? -2.811 (2.419) -0.184 (0.079) * -0.564 (1.400) 1.168 (2.215) -0.053 (0.071) 0.466 (1.185)
Head coach win % 2.808 (2.564) 0.071 (0.084) 3.505 (1.317) ** 2.429 (2.569) 0.059 (0.085) 3.407 (1.287) **
Starting QB team tenure -4.583 (1.083) *** -0.148 (0.031) *** -3.641 (0.693) *** -4.922 (1.025) *** -0.159 (0.029) *** -3.729 (0.645) ***
Coach/QB co-tenure 4.697 (1.033) *** 0.103 (0.031) *** 2.349 (0.593) *** 4.938 (0.967) *** 0.111 (0.028) *** 2.411 (0.579) ***
Over-Under -0.106 (0.125) -0.003 (0.004) 0.274 (0.078) *** -0.123 (0.124) -0.004 (0.004) 0.270 (0.078) ***
Point spread -0.697 (0.108) *** -0.025 (0.003) *** -0.229 (0.087) ** -0.675 (0.107) *** -0.024 (0.003) *** -0.224 (0.086) **
Home team? 2.278 (0.891) * 0.014 (0.035) 1.727 (0.766) * 2.323 (0.883) ** 0.016 (0.035) 1.739 (0.759) *
# of other injured players 0.160 (0.358) 0.006 (0.012) -0.023 (0.233) 0.186 (0.345) 0.007 (0.012) -0.016 (0.232)
Team total salary ($M) 0.135 (0.104) -0.003 (0.003) 0.061 (0.054) 0.117 (0.104) -0.003 (0.003) 0.056 (0.054)
Opposition coach NFL wins -0.025 (0.010) * 0.000 (0.000) -0.008 (0.007) -0.025 (0.010) * 0.000 (0.000) -0.008 (0.007)
Opposition total salary ($M) -0.144 (0.061) * -0.001 (0.002) -0.053 (0.050) -0.150 (0.061) * -0.002 (0.002) -0.055 (0.050)
Opposition wins last year -0.053 (0.182) 0.002 (0.006) -0.048 (0.127) -0.065 (0.184) 0.001 (0.006) -0.051 (0.127)





















DV: Margin DV: Win DV: Points Scored DV: Margin DV: Win DV: Points Scored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 21:  Robustness Checks – Team-Season Fixed Effects and Additional Interactions  
 
 
Note:  Unit of analysis is team-game.  1,024 observations representing all 612 regular season games played in the National Football League in 2011 and 
2012. Robust standard errors clustered by team are presented in parenthesis.  †p<.10,* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001 Two tailed test 
 
  
Head coach tenure*QB Injured -0.981 (0.761) -0.032 (0.018) † -0.107 (0.498) -1.464 (0.747) † -0.051 (0.023) * -0.459 (0.546)
Coach/QB co-tenure*QB Injured 2.626 (1.083) * 0.080 (0.036) * 1.497 (0.704) *
Coach win % * QB Injured -12.706 (10.392) -0.187 (0.363) -6.910 (6.654)
QB tenure * QB Injured -0.299 (0.557) -0.026 (0.012) * -0.228 (0.341)
Head coach team tenure 0.947 (0.252) *** 0.017 (0.008) * 0.217 (0.233)
Starting QB Injured? -1.179 (3.575) -0.113 (0.097) -1.633 (2.038) 4.869 (3.896) 0.014 (0.160) 2.560 (2.569)
Head coach win % 3.192 (3.060) 0.065 (0.102) 3.810 (1.498) *
Starting QB team tenure 0.183 (1.394) -0.049 (0.028) -1.231 (0.683)
Coach/QB co-tenure -4.900 (0.949) *** -0.113 (0.026) *** -2.398 (0.574) ***
Over-Under -0.179 (0.150) -0.004 (0.005) 0.199 (0.093) * -0.108 (0.126) -0.004 (0.004) 0.278 (0.079) ***
Point spread -0.545 (0.116) *** -0.021 (0.004) *** -0.147 (0.084) -0.680 (0.109) *** -0.024 (0.003) *** -0.226 (0.087) **
Home team? 2.935 (0.905) ** 0.030 (0.035) 2.084 (0.764) ** 2.343 (0.882) ** 0.016 (0.035) 1.751 (0.760) *
# of other injured players 0.264 (0.343) 0.007 (0.012) -0.042 (0.221) 0.154 (0.352) 0.006 (0.012) -0.034 (0.236)
Team total salary ($M) 0.121 (0.108) -0.003 (0.003) 0.058 (0.057)
Opposition coach NFL wins -0.027 (0.009) ** 0.000 (0.000) -0.010 (0.006) -0.025 (0.010) * 0.000 (0.000) -0.008 (0.007)
Opposition total salary ($M) -0.163 (0.061) ** -0.002 (0.002) -0.058 (0.044) -0.153 (0.061) * -0.002 (0.002) -0.056 (0.050)
Opposition wins last year -0.135 (0.164) 0.000 (0.006) -0.084 (0.118) -0.071 (0.185) 0.001 (0.006) -0.054 (0.128)




























DV: Margin DV: Win DV: Points Scored DV: Margin DV: Win DV: Points Scored
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